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The purpose of this study was to investigate the relation of 
Dogmatism to amount and persistence of opinion change induced by active 
versus passive participation.
Procedure
Initial measures of Dogmatism and opinions concerning two 
selected issues were obtained from University of North Dakota under­
graduates. Females who scored within one standard deviation of the 
mean opinion score of at least one of the issues and who rated that 
issue as salient were retained for experimental treatment.
Treatment occurred eleven weeks later and consisted of either 
reading (Passive Induction) a persuasive communication concerning the 
relevant issue or improvising and writing (Active Induction) a per­
suasive communication concerning the relevant issue. An immediate 
post-treatment opinionnaire was given, followed in two weeks by a 
third.
Results and Conclusions
The results of this study supported the following general con­
clusions :
1. Significant amounts of immediate, congruent opinion change 
occurred over both Induction Methods.
ix
2. There was a definite trend, including several significant 
differences, for the Passive Induction Method to effect more change 
than the Active Induction Method.
3. However, there was a definite trend, including several 
significant differences, for the Passively induced scores to regress 
toward pre-treatment levels; for scores Actively induced, there was 
no such trend.
4. There was a trend, including a significant difference, 
for the greater amount of change to occur in relation to the less 
salient issue.
5. Dogmatism appears not to be related to amount of per­




Review of Pertinent Literature 
Personality and Persuasibility
To paraphrase a part of McClintock's (1958) summary, a given 
type of influence at the practical level may have little effect in 
moving an entire audience in the desired direction. What may occur 
is that certain types of subjects (_Ss) move predominantly in a posi­
tive direction, others in a negative direction while still others may 
remain uninfluenced. Thus, awareness of certain personality charac­
teristics of the audience seems necessary for devising appropriate 
and effective methods of opinion change.
If "personality" may be here broadly defined as individual 
differences along various cognitive dimensions, then research has 
shown that various personality factors do indeed constitute important 
variables to be considered when discussing the overall effectiveness 
of attempts at persuasion. For example, Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Shef­
field (1949) found that, compared to Army recruits of relatively- less 
intellectual ability, recruits of above-average intellectual ability 
were less affected by a conspicuously one-sided presentation of a per­
suasive radio speech. Kelman and Cohler (1959) discovered that, among 
_Ss who had a high need for "cognitive clarity," individuals who habit­
ually reacted to ambiguity by seeking clarification and understanding
1
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("clarifiers") were swayed more by a persuasive message than those who 
typically reacted by excluding ambiguous, incongruous elements 
("simplifiers"). No consistent differences were found among Ss low in 
the need for cognitive clarity. Katz, Sarnoff, and McClintock (1956) 
showed that j5s who were high in self-defensiveness were unaffected by 
interpretative, self-insightful appeals in favor of racial tolerance 
but that Ss less self-defensive were affected in a favorable direction. 
Several studies reported in a monograph by Janis et al. (1959) all 
indicate the existence of a general trait of persuasibility or readi­
ness to accept social influence regardless of the communicator and 
topic, content, medium, and circumstances of the communication.
Active Versus Passive Participation
Active participation on one's part, in the form of improvising 
and writing persuasive essays, has been shown to be an effective tech­
nique in inducing an immediate change in opinion, even when one is 
instructed to support an opinion which is counter to one already held 
(e.g., Cohen, Brehm, & Fleming, 1958; Rabbie, Brehm, & Cohen, 1959; 
Harvey & Beverly, 1961; Elms & Janis, 1965; Janis & Gilmore, 1965; 
Rosenberg, 1965).
Passive participation in the form of merely reading persuasive 
messages has also been shown to effect immediate opinion change (e.g., 
Janis & Field, 1959; Janis & Rife, 1959; Linton & Graham, 1959; Whit­
taker, 1965).
Thus, it appears that both active and passive participation 
lead to opinion change, at least in the short run. The temporal per­
sistence of such induced change, however, has been relatively neglected.
3
A few studies have investigated the persistence of the immediate change 
induced by such active processes as group discussion (Lewin, 1958; Mit- 
nick & McGinnies, 1958), role playing (Janis & Mann, 1965), and essay 
writing (Watts, 1967). Uniformly, these studies have shown that such 
processes result in maintaining the induced change to a higher degree 
for periods lasting from seven days to a month than that of control 
groups who listened to a taped role-play session, observed a film, or 
read a persuasive message. Watts' (1967) study seems to be the sole 
one relating to persistence of change induced by a passive reading 
process. He found that after six weeks _Ss who constructed persuasive 
arguments held a clear superiority in maintenance of induced change 
over those who passively read a prepared passage.
Persistence in the present study will refer to the maintenance 
of induced change over a two-week period.
Saliency
Saliency, which has been an elusive and ill-defined concept in 
psychology, will be referred to here as the degree to which one con­
siders an issue to be important and the amount of thought one has given 
an issue. It has been suggested (e.g., Janis & Field, 1959; Katz, 1960) 
that the general factor of persuasibility may be more important in 
determining one's response to attempts at persuasion where the issue 
involved is relatively unknown or unfamiliar and so is not supported by 
strong intrapersonal motivational patterns as compared to an issue 
about which most people may be expected to have some familiarity and, 
consequently, established opinions, the presence of which may serve to 
inhibit change.
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Empirical evidence will be presented below which shows that, on 
the basis of measures used in this study, the two issues selected do 
differ in relative degree of saliency. In other words, the topics vary 
in the extent to which predispositions toward persuasibility may be 
expected to be elicited.
Rokeach's Theory of Dogmatism
It .has been noted above that individual differences in person­
ality play no small role in responsiveness to persuasive communications. 
The presentation of a comparatively new theory of personality follows 
together with deductions pertaining to the effects that various degrees 
of a personality dimension have upon the amount and persistence of in­
duced opinion change. There will also be offered predictions as to how 
the extent of individual participation in the induction process and the 
saliency of an issue will interact with the personality continuum in 
affecting the amount and persistence of opinion change.
In presenting his theory of personality, Rokeach (1954; 1956; 
1960) has argued that the California Fascism (F) scale, the well-known 
paper-and-pencil measure of authoritarianism devised by Adorno et al. 
(1950), measures primarily right-wing or conservative, rather than 
general, authoritarianism and intolerance. Rokeach has attempted to 
enlarge the concept of authoritarianism as measured by the F scale by 
developing his concept of Dogmatism together with a paper-and-pencil 
gauge of individual differences in degree of the trait, the Dogmatism 
(D) scale. To briefly delineate his rationale, Rokeach feels that 
research on authoritarianism began at a time, the onset of World War 
II, when the problems of fascism, anti-Semitism, and ethnocentrism
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were very real and immediate concerns and that, consequently, authori­
tarianism was "naturally" equated with intolerance, political-economic 
conservatism, and especially fascistic ideology. The result was, of 
course, that the F scale was expressly designed to measure such atti­
tudes. But, as Rokeach correctly notes, authoritarianism is also a 
naturally occurring phenomenon in science, philosophy, literature, and 
the arts where the concepts of fascism and ethnocentrism are not neces­
sarily relevant. Moreover, the existence of incongruous relationships 
which have been observed such as a person scoring high on authoritar­
ianism but low on ethnocentrism seems to indicate that the F scale is 
measuring a concept that is relatively narrow in scope. Considered in 
this way, it is apparent that authoritarianism need not necessarily 
take fascistic or ethnocentric form. The conceptual problem, as 
Rokeach sees it, is that the total range of phenomena indicative of 
authoritarianism is much greater than that studied by the California 
researchers. To be sure, a high degree of authoritarianism tends to 
be associated with ideologies containing antidemocratic content but 
is not uniquely so related; authoritarianism cuts across specific 
ideological orientations and is manifested within all areas of human 
endeavor.
Rokeach also distinguishes Dogmatism from the concept of 
rigidity. Whereas both rigidity and Dogmatism are forms of resistence 
to change, rigidity is conceived to be a relatively less intellectu- 
alized, abstract, and organized form of resistence than Dogmatism. 
Rigidity refers to the description of specific task behavior where Dog­
matism applies to a pervasive syndrome of personality characteristics
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which are reflected in one's perceptual, cognitive, and especially 
interpersonal behavior. For example, a rat, the feeble-minded, or 
the brain-damaged can be said to behave rigidly but not dogmatically. 
Again, one can be described as solving a problem rigidly but a profes­
sor, theoretician, or an art critic can be said to express himself dog­
matically. In sum, the range of behavior subsumed under Rokeach's 
concept of Dogmatism is meant to be broader than that of rigidity or 
authoritarianism as measured by the F scale and is therefore intrinsi­
cally more interesting to the political scientist or historian as well 
as the psychologist.
The following paragraphs present in a highly condensed form 
the latest version of the theory of Dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960, chapters 
2 & 3) followed by a sampling of supportive empirical evidence.
Rokeach begins by defining a belief as an expectancy or im­
plicit predisposition to action which is inferable from one's verbal 
and non-verbal behavior. Many such beliefs, when organized, form one's 
belief-disbelief system; the belief system being an organized set of 
beliefs which one accepts while one's disbelief system is actually a 
series of systems which one rejects, each of which is arranged along 
a gradient of similarity to the belief system. For example, Catholics, 
Unitarians, and Jews each accept one set of beliefs while rejecting 
several others. The belief system represents all the beliefs, sets, 
expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious and unconscious, that one at a 
given time accepts as true of the world he lives in. Conversely, the 
disbelief system is composed of a series of subsystems rather than 
merely a single one and contains all the disbeliefs, sets, expectancies,
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conscious and unconscious, that, to one degree or another, a person at 
a given time rejects as false. The elements within such systems are 
not necessarily logically related. Rather, logical relationships be­
tween parts of one's belief and disbelief systems constitute a sub­
class of psycho-logical (i.e., nonlogical) systems. Thus, elements 
within a system may be interrelated without necessarily being logi­
cally interrelated. In fact, Rokeach stresses that certain parts may • 
be isolated from each other while still retaining the potential for 
some kind of interrelationship. One's belief-disbelief system, there­
fore, is considered to be an organization of parts, the ultimate units 
being single beliefs and disbeliefs, which may or may not be logically 
interrelated. All people have belief-disbelief systems for, if logical 
interconnectedness were the sole criterion, then some people could be 
said to have them and others not. At the extreme, some belief-disbelief 
systems may have little or no communication among parts but the potential 
for such communication remains.
A belief-disbelief system is more than a religious or political 
or scientific system since it is doubtful that one's cognitions are 
neatly subdivided into such separated, mutually exclusive compartments. 
For example, a Catholic's belief that communism is evil is not only a 
religious but a political belief. Hence, it is more correct to describe 
one's belief-disbelief system as a political-religious-philosophical- 
et cetera system. In sum, a belief-disbelief system is more inclusive 
than what is normally meant by "ideology"; it includes such institution­
alized sets of beliefs as well as some highly personalized beliefs which 
will be discussed shortly.
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According to Rokeach, the organization of one's beliefs involves 
a tripartite schema. The first of these three dimensions, organization 
along a belief-disbelief continuum, has already been introduced but 
will be discussed in more detail below. The second dimension is that 
of a central-peripheral gradient while the third consists of a time- 
perspective dimension. Each of these three major cognitive dimensions 
will be briefly elaborated below.
As noted, all of one's beliefs can be organized into two inter­
dependent parts; a belief system and a disbelief system. The disbelief 
system is assumed to be composed of several disbelief subsystems, each 
varying in degree of similarity to the belief system. A further assump­
tion is that disbelief subsystems that are similar to the belief system 
are more acceptable to a person than less similar ones. For example, 
people with different beliefs often have to cooperate with each other 
as in coalition governments or joint-service military operations. In 
part at least, success of such cooperation may depend on the similarity 
between the different belief systems. The belief-disbelief system has 
additional characteristics; among the theoretically important ones are 
isolation of beliefs that are intrinsically related and the accentuation 
of differences-minimization of similarities between belief and disbelief 
systems. For example, isolation is apparent in the coexistence of logi­
cally contradictory beliefs within the belief system (e.g., being for 
democracy but also advocating government by an elite). Advocates of 
Catholicism and communism who both insist that the two systems have 
absolutely nothing in common are displaying an accentuation of differ­
ences where, by objective standards, there may be important similarities.
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On the other hand, the Hearst concept of "Communzai" implies no distinc­
tion between two concepts where there may in fact be certain important 
divergences.
The second organizational aspect of all belief-disbelief systems 
is that of a central-peripheral dimension. The central belief region is 
comprised of a person's primitive beliefs regarding, for instance, the 
nature of the physical and social world, one's self, or whether or not 
people are to be feared or trusted. These primitive beliefs are analog­
ous to geometric axioms; that is, beliefs that are assumed by the person 
to enjoy the total consensus of external referents. To illustrate, the 
belief that my name is so-and-so or that the object that I type with is 
a typewriter or that this world is basically an unfriendly place are 
primitive beliefs. The intermediate region is composed of beliefs 
about the nature of positive and negative authority where authority is 
defined as any source to whom one looks for information about the uni­
verse or to check information one already possesses. Persons differing 
in amount of Dogmatism do not differ so merely because one relies on 
authority and the other does not; the crucial difference, as Rokeach 
sees it, is that of the utterly divergent ideas each has about the 
nature of authority and how to use such authority as the mediating link 
between themselves and the world which they seek to understand. Thus, 
two persons may adhere to opposing ideological positions but both be­
lieve in an absolute authority, one true cause, etc. so that, while the 
specific content of their beliefs differ, the formal content is identi­
cal. Included also in the intermediate region are beliefs about people 
in general. The formal content here is that people are to be evaluated,
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accepted, or rejected according to how they line up with authority and 
belief systems. This tie between one's acceptance of other people and 
of ideas derived from authority is exemplified by the use of opinion­
ated language such as "Only a simple-minded fool would believe that 
. . ."or "Any intelligent person can see that . . ."or "The idea 
that . . .  is pure hogwash." Therefore, when authority is seen as 
absolute, one's beliefs about people-who-have-beliefs cause him to make 
extreme distinctions between persons as faithful and unfaithful, loyal 
and subversive, or American and un-American. Those who disagree may be 
rejected as enemies of God, country, or the working class while those 
who agree may be accepted but only so long as and on condition that 
they continue to agree. The peripheral region contains all those non­
primitive beliefs and disbeliefs which issue from positive and negative 
authority, regardless of whether or not such beliefs are consciously 
perceived as being thus derived by the person himself. The specific 
content of peripheral beliefs and disbeliefs is what is subsumed under 
the more familiar term "ideology." That is, favorable or unfavorable 
beliefs about birth control or the New Deal are considered peripheral 
beliefs because they are derivable from the formal content of one's 
beliefs about the Catholic Church or Roosevelt. The latter, according 
to Rokeach, are part of the intermediate region rather than the periph­
eral region. Thus, if one knew the specific nature of a person's inter­
mediate beliefs about authority one could deduce from them the content 
of large numbers of many other beliefs. In other words, all a person's 
beliefs are not equally weighted; some are more strategically placed
than others.
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Since Rokeach holds the structural interrelations among the cen­
tral, intermediate, and peripheral regions to be of chief importance in 
understanding the dynamics of Dogmatism and since the present experiment 
seeks to validate deductions obtained from a study of such structural 
interrelations, there follows a brief clarification of how such inter­
connections affect the normal thinking and cognitive processes. All 
information impinging upon a person from the outside must be processed, 
encoded, or thought of in such a way that it is either rejected or 
somehow fitted into the belief-disbelief system. This operation begins 
with the initial screening for compatibility with the primitive beliefs. 
This initial screening may lead to the rejection of this information so 
that nothing further need be done with it. As a case in point, the cur­
rent work on extra-sensory perception is ignored by many people because 
it violates the primitive belief that reality can be known only through 
the senses. But even if the new information is consistent with primi­
tive beliefs, it may not be so with one's intermediate (i.e., authority) 
beliefs. Accordingly, people often selectively avoid contact with 
people, events, books, etc. that threaten the validity of their belief 
systems or the "invalidity" of their disbelief system. Such protection 
may also be achieved for the person by his authority sources as, for 
example, by the publication of lists of taboo books or the liquidation 
of ideological enemies. Obviously, not all new information is handled 
in the above ways. Much new information does get through without being 
rejected outright wholly or in part by being somehow assimilated into 
the belief-disbelief system. This may require altering or rationalizing 
the new material in such ways as discovering what one's positive and
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negative authority sources have to say about it. Finally, the new mate­
rial, after having been screened, distorted, or otherwise made compati­
ble with both one's primitive and intermediate beliefs, is filed into 
one's Weltanschauung or peripheral belief region.
This filing process is further explained by Rokeach. New mate­
rial, represented psychologically in the peripheral region as a belief 
or disbelief, may or may not be related to or be in communication with 
other peripheral beliefs or disbeliefs. Therefore, the greater this 
isolation the less direct effect will a change in one belief have upon 
adjacent ones. However, there still can be indirect communication among 
peripheral beliefs via the intermediate (authority) region. For in­
stance, a "party-line" change can be conceptualized as a change in a 
particular peripheral belief as a result of instruction coming from 
one's authority sources. That is, there is a relatively high degree of 
communication between peripheral and intermediate regions but not among 
particular peripheral beliefs or disbeliefs. A more "genuine" change 
may be conceived of as taking place if a new belief, or a change in an 
old belief, even though preceded by a communication from one's authority 
sources, sets off a sequence of autonomous activity that changes other 
peripheral beliefs, thereby changing the internal organization of the 
peripheral region and of the intermediate and primitive regions possibly 
as well.
This filing process just described is not necessarily to be 
thought of as a "coercing operation." Rather, the extent to which 
information about the world is coerced into the system depends upon 
the degree to which the total belief-disbelief, system is "closed" or
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"open." The precise meaning of "open" and "closed" will be given later 
but for now the following brief distinction will be made: at the 
closed extreme, the individual "tampers" with new information by alter­
ing it or isolating it from other beliefs, resulting in the preservation 
of his belief-disbelief system. At the open extreme, just the reverse 
occurs; one assimilates the new material as is. Being thus reconciled 
with other beliefs, the new material communicates with other peripheral, 
as well as intermediate, beliefs to produce "genuine" as opposed to 
"party-line" changes in the whole belief-disbelief system.
To summarize, it is immaterial whether or not a belief-disbelief 
system is open or closed. The point is that it forms a psychological 
system which in turn may or may not be a logically arranged system.
Thus, Rokeach claims that one's thinking may be "confused" or "dis­
organized" but one still has his belief-disbelief system. It is the 
structural interconnection among central, intermediate, and the periph­
eral beliefs that gives the total belief-disbelief system its integrated 
character. Whatever characterizes the primitive region is assumed to be 
reflected within the intermediate region and whatever characterizes the 
latter will be further reflected in the peripheral region. Therefore, 
the belief-disbelief system, however illogical, is still assumed to be 
a highly organized system possessing certain structural relations among 
its parts.
The third and final organizational dimension of belief-disbelief 
systems is the time-perspective dimension. Rokeach posits that peoples' 
beliefs about the past, present, and future and the relations among 
these beliefs vary from a narrow to a broad perspective. A broad time-
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perspective is one in which the person’s past, present, and future are 
all represented within the belief-disbelief system and the person sees 
them as related to each other. A narrow-time perspective is one in 
which the person over-emphasizes or fixates on one of the three aspects 
without appreciating the continuity and connections that exist among 
them. Some illustrations of narrow time-perspectives are as follows: 
in most ideological movements of the political right, the model sought 
is typically that of some now-past glorious or more perfect state. The 
reminiscences of a senile person typically express a preoccupation with 
the past. An infant's behavior just as typically manifests an almost 
total preoccupation with the immediate present as does that of a highly 
impulsive adult. However, it is the future-oriented variety of narrow 
time-perspective that is central to Rokeach's formulations. For some 
persons, it is primarily the future that counts. For instance, many 
religious and political movements have stressed the importance of work­
ing for some future Utopia or new order. To these kinds of people, the 
present is but a purgatory to be at best endured or perhaps even vio­
lently changed to hasten the coming of the new order. In addition to 
discounting the present, such people can be expected to profess an 
"understanding" of the future, to be more willing to make predictions 
about the future, and to express a greater confidence in what the 
future holds in store.
The preceding paragraphs have described in some detail Rokeach's 
ideas about the organization of personality along three major interdepen­
dent cognitive dimensions. To summarize the foregoing material into 
workable hypotheses, the following outline of defining characteristics of 
open-closed systems is presented (Rokeach, 1960, pages 55-56).
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A Belief-Disbelief System Is
Open Closed
A. to the extent that, with respect to its organization along the 
belief-disbelief continuum,
1. the magnitude of rejection of 
disbelief subsystems is rela­
tively low at each point along 
the continuum;
2. there is communication of parts 
within and between belief and 
disbelief systems;
3. there is relatively little dis­
crepancy in the degree of dif­
ferentiation between belief and 
disbelief systems;
4. there is relatively high dif­
ferentiation within the dis­
belief system;
1. the magnitude of rejection of 
disbelief subsystems is rela­
tively high at each point 
along the disbelief continuum;
2. there is isolation of parts 
within and between belief and 
disbelief systems;
3. there is relatively great dis­
crepancy in the degree of dif­
ferentiation between belief 
and disbelief systems;
4. there is relatively little dif­
ferentiation within the dis­
belief system;
B . to the extent that, with respect to the organization along the 
central-peripheral dimension,
1. the specific content of primi­
tive beliefs (central region) 
is to the effect that the 
world one lives in, or the 
situation one is in at a par­
ticular moment, is a friendly 
one;
2. the formal content of beliefs 
about authority and about 
people who hold to systems of 
authority (intermediate region) 
is to the effect that authority 
is not absolute and that people 
are not to be evaluated (if 
they are to be evaluated at all) 
according to their agreement or 
disagreement with such authority;
1. the specific content of primi­
tive beliefs (central region) 
is to the effect that the world 
one lives in, or the situation 
one is in at a particular 
moment, is a threatening one;
2. the formal content of beliefs 
about authority and about 
people who hold to systems of 
authority (intermediate region) 
is to the effect that authority 
is absolute and that people are 
to be accepted and rejected 
according to their agreement
or disagreement with such 
authority;
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3. the structure of beliefs and 
disbeliefs perceived to emanate 
from authority (peripheral 
region) is such that its sub­
structures are in relative com­
munication with each other, and 
finally;
3. the structure of beliefs and 
disbeliefs perceived to ema­
nate from authority (periph­
eral region) is such that its 
substructures are in relative 
isolation with each other, 
and finally;
C. to the extent that, with respect to the time-perspective dimen­
sion, there is a
1. relatively broad time perspec- 1. relatively narrow, future 
tive. oriented time-perspective.
A more basic definition is offered by Rokeach (1960, pages
57-58) .
This leads us to suggest a basic characteristic that defines 
the extent to which a person's system is open or closed; namely, 
the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate, and act on 
relevant information received from the outside on its own in­
trinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situa­
tion arising from within the person or from the outside. Examples 
of irrelevant internal pressures that interfere with the realistic 
reception of information are unrelated habits, beliefs, and per­
ceptual cues, irrational ego motives, power needs, the need for 
self-aggrandizement, the need to allay anxiety, and so forth. By 
irrelevant external pressures we have in mind most particularly 
the pressures of reward and punishment arising from external 
authority; for example, as exerted by parents, peers, other author­
ity figures, reference groups, social and institutional norms, and 
cultural norms.
To this definition must be added Rokeach's idea of the dual 
aspect of all information received from the outside. He believes that 
all such messages contain information about the world plus information 
about the source. That is, a statement by Secretary of State Rusk that 
North Vietnam is as stubborn as ever about the issue of negotiations 
contains information about the North Vietnamese which, to the extent 
one judges it to be factually correct, should engender or reinforce a 
corresponding cognitive belief about whether they are indeed as stub­
born as ever over negotiations. This belief should in turn serve to
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guide one’s action with respect to North Vietnam. Such a statement 
also contains information about Secretary Rusk himself, what he be­
lieves, what he wants us to believe, and what he_ wants us to do about 
it. This aspect of the statement may give rise to or reinforce vari­
ous cognitive beliefs about Rusk and serve to guide other action—  
for example, to get rid of Rusk or not, to get rid of the Democrats 
at the next election or not, etc. Rokeach assumes that the more open 
the belief system, the more will the dual character of the communica­
tion received from Rusk be appreciated and responded to with discern­
ment, each piece of information being weighed on its own merits; and 
that the more closed the system the less cognitive discrimination can 
be expected between the two sets of information, beliefs, and con­
sequent actions. In sum, the implication here is that the more open 
a person's belief system, the more strength should he have to resist 
externally imposed rewards or punishments. These consequences should 
be less effective as determinants of the way information will be 
evaluated and acted upon. Conversely, the more closed the belief 
system, the more difficult it should be to distinguish between infor­
mation received about the world and information received about the 
source of the information. What the external source says is true 
should become confused with what the source wants one to believe is 
true and wants one to do about it.
Concerning the motivational aspects of belief-disbelief sys­
tems, Rokeach assumes that all such systems serve two powerful and con­
flicting motives simultaneously: the need for a cognitive framework to 
know and to understand and the need to ward off threatening aspects of
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reality. To the extent that the cognitive need to know is predominant 
and the need to ward off threat absent, open systems should result.
But as the need to guard against threat becomes stronger, the cognitive 
need to know should become weaker, resulting in more closed belief sys­
tems. Under threat, information and source should become inseparable 
and should be evaluated arbitrarily in line with the rewards and pun­
ishments meted out by authority. For most persons in most situations, 
both sets of needs operate together to a certain degree. A person will 
be open to information insofar as possible and will reject, screen, or 
alter it insofar as necessary. No matter how much one's system closes 
up to ward off anxiety, it still serves as a cognitive framework for 
satisfying the need to know. Thus, one can distort the world to what­
ever extent necessary but simultaneously preserve the illusion of under­
standing it. And if the closed or dogmatic mind is extremely resistant 
to change, it may be so not only because it allays anxiety but also 
because it satisfies the need to know.
At the individual level, threat or anxiety may arise out of ad­
verse experiences, temporary or enduring, which are shaped by and which, 
in turn, shape broader human conditions. To varying degrees, individ­
uals may become disposed to accept or to form closed systems of thinking 
and believing in proportion to the degree to which they are made to feel 
alone, isolated, and helpless in the world in which they live and thus 
anxious of what the future holds for them. Such conditions should lead 
to pervasive feelings of self-inadequacy and self-hate. Attempts may be 
made to overcome such feelings by becoming excessively concerned with 
needs for power and status. Along with such an overconcern there may
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be compensatory attitudes of egoism and misanthropy which feelings in 
turn lead to feelings of guilt and to a generally disaffected outlook 
on life.
Rokeach has developed an objective paper-and-pencil measure of 
individual differences in openness or closedness of belief systems, the 
D scale. Because of the way in which open and closed are defined, the 
D scale should also serve to measure general authoritarianism and 
general intolerance. His procedure in constructing the individual items 
was largely deductive; that is, from the working definition of open- 
closed systems presented above, Rokeach attempted to construct state­
ments that would tap the characteristics of open and closed systems. 
Above all, each item in the D scale had to transcend specific ideolog­
ical positions in order to tap the formal and structural characteristics 
of all positions. Thus, persons adhering dogmatically to such diverse 
viewpoints as Catholicism and anti-Catholicism should all score together 
at one end of the score continuum and should all score in a direction 
opposite to others having equally diverse yet undogmatic views. The 
final revised form of the D scale contains 40 items, each of which is 
answered by marking +1, +2, or +3 or -1, -2, or -3 to indicate one's 
degree of agreement or disagreement, respectively. In all cases, 
agreement with the item is scored in the closed or dogmatic direction. 
Each of the three major organizational dimensions of belief-disbelief 
systems are represented in the scale's content. For example, an item 
assumed to tap isolation within and between belief and disbelief sys­
tems is "The United States and Russia have just about nothing in com­
mon." An item involving the specific content of primitive beliefs is
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"Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature." Finally, an 
item designed to measure one's time-perspective is "The present is 
all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts."
In addition to presenting the latest version of his theory, 
Rokeach's book (1960) also includes the report of a series of valida­
tion studies. For instance, the D and F scale scores correlate moder­
ately (+.54 to +.77) with each other. Catholics, Protestants, and 
religiously unaffiliated _Ss rank from highest to lowest in terms of D 
scores, respectively. Catholics score high on both the D and F scales 
while English communists, who also score high on the D scale, have the 
lowest F scores among the groups tested. Further, Ss who score low on 
the D scale (i.e., in the open-minded, undogmatic direction) as com­
pared to those scoring high on the scale (i.e., in the closed-minded, 
dogmatic direction) have been shown to prefer conventional (Brahms) 
to unconventional (Schonberg) music; to be poorer in problem solving 
situations where the synthesis of new information is required; and to 
be slower to perceive inherent contradictions within a given piece of 
information.
There is also a growing body of independently conducted empiri­
cal research, generally supportive in nature, concerning various 
aspects of Rokeach's theory. The following selected studies are meant 
to show the scope and direction of experimentation generated by his 
formulations. That high D _Ss do indeed discriminate a message from 
its source less well than do low D Ss has been shown by several inves­
tigators. Vidulich and Kaimen (1961) found that dogmatic Ss conformed 
more than undogmatic _Ss to prearranged estimates of autokinetic movement
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given by a stooge when the unseen stooge was introduced as a high status 
(college professor) source. McCarty and Johnson (1962) discovered that 
dogmatic JSs tended to believe official police reports of a student riot 
to a greater extent than undogmatic Ss who tended to believe students' 
reports of the same event. Powell (1962) showed that high D _Ss displayed 
a smaller difference between semantic differential profiles of presiden­
tial candidates and their campaign statements than did low D Ss.
Several studies have provided replication of some of Rokeach's 
early work. Plant (1960), repeating Rokeach's attempts to correlate 
the F, D, and E (ethnocentrism) scales, found that the relationships 
as reported by Rokeach did hold. Plant concluded that the D scale is 
indeed a purer measure of authoritarianism than the F scale and is less 
contaminated by items measuring prejudice and ethnocentric tendencies 
than is the F scale. Barker (1963) confirmed Rokeach's contention that 
the D and F scales measure different kinds of authoritarianism. Barker 
found that dogmatic right-wing activists scored higher on the F scale 
than did equally dogmatic, left-wing activists among Ohio State under­
graduates. He also found that F scores correlated significantly (rho 
=+.50) with measures of political-economic conservatism while D scores 
did not (rho=+.07). Koepp (1963) confirmed Rokeach's finding that 
Catholics score higher on the D scale than do members of other reli­
gious groups. Zagona and Zurcher (1964; 1965a; 1965b), observing 
recitation classes composed entirely of either high or lox-r D scorers 
over a semester, found that, compared to low D _Ss, dogmatic ̂ s lacked 
spontaneity; exhibited dependence on the class instructor; preferred 
objective to essay exams; were intolerant of unconventional behavior; 
and scored lower on a "creativity" test of verbal remote associates.
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Some of the researchers have applied Rokeach's formulations to 
the study of race prejudice and have discovered that a large part of 
prejudice can be explained by belief similarity rather than race or 
skin color. That is, studying friendship preferences and sociometric 
choices among both children and adults, the perceived similarity of 
belief between two people serves as a better predictor of such choices 
than the racial or ethnic make-up of the dyads (Stein, Mardyk, & Smith, 
1965; Rokeach & Mezel, 1966; Stein, 1966; Smith, Williams, & Willis, 
1967).
Several factor analytic studies (Rokeach & Fruchter, 1956; 
Fruchter, Rokeach, & Novak, 1958; Kerlinger & Rokeach, 1966) have shown 
that the F and D scales are factorally distinct from one another as pre­
dicted by Rokeach. That is, the D scale is loaded with factors similar 
to those that Rokeach hypothesized but which do not appear at all or to 
the same degree in the factoral composition of the F scale.
Dogmatism and Opinion Change
Although Rokeach does not explicitly discuss the relation of Dog­
matism to opinion change, such a relationship might be deduced from the 
following considerations. It has been shown that, as hypothesized, high 
D Ss confuse or discriminate less well than low D j5s a source from its 
message. This fact, plus the theoretical differentiation between open 
and closed-minded j>s— the ability to independently and critically eval­
uate information on its own merits— suggests that dogmatic Ss tend to 
be more persuaded than undogmatic Ss by propagandists messages. When 
such messages are presented to dogmatic Ss, such persons will be pre­
disposed toward accepting the messages' substance by their habit of
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allowing external sources to provide "pre-packaged" opinions. Open- 
minded S_s, however, will be less likely to be influenced, at least 
immediately, by persuasive communications since they are characterized 
by a habitual manner of detached, independent, critical evaluation of 
new information. That open-minded jSs do take longer to reach a deci­
sion and declare a greater need for more pre-decisional information 
than closed-minded _S_s has been established by Long and Ziller (1965). 
Thus, open-minded J3s will display the effects of the message only after 
they have "worked through" the new material while, conversely, closed- 
minded S_s are more likely to exhibit immediate opinion change.
In terms of persistence of induced opinions, it may be antici­
pated that high D Ss will maintain their newly acquired opinions when 
such persistence is measured by a delayed post-treatment opinionnaire. 
On the other hand, low D Ss will be as persistent once the material is 
assimilated but the effects of such assimilation will be evident only 
some time after the treatment. That is, there should be no change in 
opinion scores among high D S_s from an immediate post-treatment (IPT) 
measure to a delayed post-treatment (DPT) measure. However, among low 
D Ss there will be a change in such scores between the two measures.
In a situation, however, where one is called upon to construct 
a persuasive message, one becomes in a sense both source and recipient. 
Such situation should allow for the maximal play of one's own inner 
resources— motives, cognitive habits, self-feelings, etc.— in deter­
mining how one will react to such a task. Dogmatic jSs, relatively 
unused to spontaneous, independent thought, might be expected to remain 
unmoved and uninfluenced by a self-constructed argument. The habit of
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appreciating "pre-packaged" opinions over independent, creative thought 
should lead to no change or perhaps even a reversal of opinion about 
the issue. Open-minded Sis, on the other hand, should tend to be rela­
tively more influenced by their own efforts at constructing arguments 
since they are more "creative," self-assured, and independent. Thus, 
unlike the situation where jSs passively read a persuasive message, 
closed-minded Sis should exhibit no immediate opinion change when asked 
to actively construct an argument. Open-minded j5s, in this case, should 
respond to their own efforts favorably by registering an immediate 
opinion change.
In terms of persistence of actively induced change, closed- 
minded Ss should remain unconvinced by such personally constructed 
propaganda while undogmatic SA should persist in their actively induced 
opinions.
A review of pertinent literature shows only three published 
studies dealing with the relation between D scores and persuasive com­
munications. Miller (1965) hypothesized that dogmatic Ss would have 
difficulty in synthesizing new material which was discrepant with an 
already held opinion and so would prefer some response other than 
opinion change. From a pool of over 800 high school Ss, he picked 40 
which were equally divided between the extreme quartiles of the D 
score distribution and an opinion score distribution associated with 
the topic of floridation. Miller added a third dimension, involvement, 
so that the overall design was of the form 2 x 2 x 2  with five S_s per 
cell. "Involvement" was effected by administering to each S individ­
ually a 300-word "pep" speech stressing the importance of S_'s
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participation in the study the ostensible purpose of which was to gather 
a national sample of opinion on the issue of floridation or increased 
math and science requirements in high school, depending upon which 
involvement group he was assigned. The experimental treatment was indi­
vidually administered to each _S four to ten months after the initial 
measure of opinion and Dogmatism and consisted of presenting to each _S, 
after he had become involved in either the relevant or the irrelevant 
issue, a three-minute taped speech which was at odds with his initial 
position on floridation. The results of an analysis of IPT opinionnaire 
scores showed that the main effect of involvement was the only signifi­
cant effect among the interactions and other main effect of Dogmatism 
in that involvement in the relevant issue of floridation alone served 
to inhibit the effectiveness of the speech as measured by little posi­
tive (i.e., counter-attitudinal) opinion change. Further, the least 
amount of positive change was exhibited under conditions of high D- 
involvement in relevant issue while the largest amount of such change 
occurred under conditions of low D-irrelevant issue involvement.
Miller concluded that, compared to involvement, Dogmatism was a weak 
inhibitor of the message's effectiveness and, hence, opinion change.
Norris (1965) hypothesized that dogmatic _Ss, because of their 
inability to distinguish source from message, should display a greater 
amount of opinion change than undogmatic E>s when a high status source 
proclaims a view that is highly dissonant with a generally held cul­
tural truism. Each of 101 college Ss was given one of four page-long 
messages in a "news-story" form, each of which was attributed to a 
high status source (the United States Public Health Service) and which
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attacked the validity of a cultural truism (e.g., the efficacy of having 
an annual chest X-ray, brushing one's teeth regularly, etc.) Six weeks 
prior to this treatment, the ^s were divided into two groups on the 
basis of a median split of D scores. Ten days prior to the treatment, 
initial opinion scores toward the truisms were obtained. Corroborating 
previous independently conducted research, Norris found that the truisms 
enjoyed a very high level of favorableness. Treatment consisted of 
distributing to an intact class the four "news stories," then present­
ing an IPT opinionnaire. Analysis of the change scores in the 2 x 4  
design revealed that, across all four truisms, high D scorers changed 
more than low D scorers toward the position advocated in the stories 
but that only on one issue (the inadvisibility of an annual chest X-ray) 
was the difference statistically significant. Norris offered the post 
hoc suggestion that stories carried in the mass media at approximately 
the same time as the treatment administration to the effect that lack 
of precautions in X-ray procedures may indeed be injurious had dif­
ferentially affected high and low D S_s.
Miller and Lobe (1967) predicted that closed-minded Ss would 
be more influenced than open-minded Ss by a persuasive message couched 
in opinionated language (e.g., Any intelligent person can see that 
. . .) than in unopinionated language. Eighty college j>s were divided 
into two groups on the basis of a median split of D scores obtained 
from an abridged D scale two weeks before the administration of the 
treatment. Initial opinion scores toward a series of topics were also 
collected at this time. The ultimately selected target topic had a 
moderate to highly unfavorable degree of acceptance among the Ss. A
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persuasive message, the content of which was counter to the opinion held 
by the majority of j>s concerning the target topic, was constructed in 
two versions, one containing opinionated language, the other not. The 
message was attributed to a source (an American astronaut) that, accord­
ing to J5s ' ratings, had high status. Each S_ received one of the two 
forms of the persuasive message during a regularly scheduled class meet­
ing. Immediately after reading the message, each J3 completed a second 
opinionnaire. Analysis of the change scores in the 2 x 2  design showed 
that, first, a significant amount of change occurred in all four treat­
ment combinations and, second, that Dogmatism did not have an effect on 
the amount of change while the presence of the opinionated language 
resulted in a larger positive (i.e., counter-attitudinal) change rela­
tive to the use of unopinionated language.
Problem and Hypotheses
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the relation of 
individual differences in levels of Dogmatism to the amount and per­
sistence of opinion change induced by active versus passive participa­
tion on S/s part. While each of the three studies detailed above dealt 
with additional variables such as counter-attitudinal change and the 
effect of source status (legitimate topics for research in their own 
right), from the standpoint of the present experiment, these studies 
shed little light upon its basic aim. That aim, specifically, is to 
create a "pure" situation as free as possible from confounding arti­
facts such as sex differences in persuasibility and regression effects 
due to focusing on extremes of opinions plus the irrelevant (at least 
to this study) variable of counter-attitudinal change. None of the
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trio of studies reviewed above made provisions for an analysis of sex 
differences in degree of persuasibility. Since it has been found that, 
with treatments consisting of the reading of persuasive messages, 
females are swayed to a greater extent than males (e.g., Janis &
Field, 1959; King, 1959; Whittaker, 1965), any such differential per­
suasibility on the females' parts may have been counteracted and masked 
by the males' performance. In addition, all three studies dealing with 
D focused only on counter-attitudinal opinion change. Perhaps attempt­
ing to induce incongruent opinion change is qualitatively different 
from beginning with moderate opinions and seeking to effect change in 
one direction or another. All three also included as part of their 
design the variable of source status. What happens when the source's 
status is muted or becomes in effect a reflection of one's self-esteem?
The results of a pilot study designed to investigate some of 
the variables and procedures to be used in this dissertation may here 
be presented. During the latter half of the Fall semester of the 
1967-68 school year eight recitation sections of introductory psychol­
ogy _Ss were randomly selected to participate. Using two of the issues, 
the active and passive induction processes, and the opinionnaire de­
scribed by Watts (1967), a pair of recitation sections were randomly 
assigned to each of the four (two issues x two induction processes) 
treatment combinations. Within each recitation section, all S!s com­
pleted an initial opinionnaire, the assigned treatment combination, 
then completed an IPT opinionnaire identical to the initial one. All 
three such phases were completed within a 15-minute period of a single 
class hour. In the active process, each S_was instructed to construct
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within eight minutes a persuasive argument supporting either the admis 
sion of Puerto Rico into the Union or the more lenient court treatment 
of juvenile delinquents. The passive process consisted of alloting 
eight minutes to Ss for reading and underlining parts of a 600-word 
message arguing for Puerto Rico's admission or more lenient court 
treatment of delinquents. Since intact groups were used, each recita­
tion section's mean pre-treatment and post-treatment opinion scores on 
the assigned topic were treated as individual scores; in the 2 x 2  
table of treatment combinations, each cell thus contained two initial 
scores and two post-treatment scores. In the first analysis, initial 
scores were used as the covariant in an analysis of covariance of post 
treatment opinion scores for all Ss within each recitation section. 
Neither the issues effect, the induction effect, nor the interaction 
between the two was significant (all _F's <1). However, when a second 
analysis of covariance was conducted using only the scores of females 
located within one standard deviation (SD) of the mean opinion score 
of the relevant issue, only the induction method effect was found to 
be significant (F=12.11, df= 1/3, p <.05). The mean adjusted scores 
of the passive (reading) treatment were significantly larger than 
those of the active (writing) treatment. Perhaps the effects of the 
active process required time to manifest themselves. In any event, 
selection of females possessing relatively neutral mean opinion scores 
seemed to tap a set of conditions the effects of which would otherwise 
perhaps not have been suspected.
In view of the foregoing material, including derivations from 
Rokeach's theory, relevant studies dealing with D and opinion change, 
and the pilot study, formal hypotheses were formulated.
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1. There will be significant main effects for Induction 
Methods favoring the Passive Method in terms of mean 
amount of congruent opinion change displayed on IPT 
measures of both issues.
2. For the IPT measures of both issues, there will be a 
significant interaction between D and Induction methods 
reflecting a reversal of the magnitude of mean scores 
within Induction Methods. That is, in the Active treat­
ment, low D Ss will have a significantly higher mean 
score than high D Ss while in the Passive treatment, the 
reverse situation will hold with high D Ss having the 
significantly higher mean score.
3. In terms of persistence of change Actively induced, Ss 
at each level of D will maintain their position with 
respect to size of mean score over the IPT-DPT interval 
such that, while there will be no interaction between D 
and the interval, the significant main effect for D 
present at the IPT point will be maintained over the 
interval with low D Ss possessing a significantly higher 
mean score than the high D £[s.
A. In terms of persistence of change Passively induced, 
there will be a significant interaction between D and 
the IPT-DPT interval caused by an increase in magnitude 
of mean scores for low D ^s over the interval while S_s 
at the other two levels maintain their relative order
in terms of mean score size over the interval.
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As a secondary point of interest, it is also predicted that 
there will be a significantly greater amount of opinion change asso­
ciated with the less salient issue than with the more salient issue.
In all cases above, Ss at medium levels of D will occupy 





The Ss consisted of 146 females of American citizenship who were 
enrolled in introductory and educational psychology courses taught at 
the University of North Dakota during the Spring semester of the 1967- 
68 school year. Students enrolled in each of these courses were re­
quired to participate in a minimum of three hours of departmental re­
search. The initial and DPT measures were taken during regular class 
meetings while the treatment and IPT opinionnaires were administered in 
an evening session voluntarily attended by selected Ss.
Since a repeated-measurements design was used in which each Ŝ was 
measured three times, there were a few Ss who were absent on these occa­
sions and whose scores, consequently, could not be included in the data 
analyses. Of 146 Ss attending the treatment session, 117 were also 
available for the final DPT measure.
Materials
The forty items of the Form E (Rokeach, 1960, pages 73-80)D 
scale were randomly interspersed among filler items which included the 
fifteen-item L scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(Hathaway & Meehl, 1951) plus thirty-five items selected from Rokeach's 
Opinionation scale (Rokeach, 1960, pages 83-84). Scores on the D scale
32
33
could range from zero to forty with high scores indicating closed­
mindedness and low scores indicating open-mindedness. The manifest 
content of the D and Opinionation items served to give face validity 
to the title "Social-Political Opinion Survey" which was attached to the 
collection of 90 items. Separate answer sheets were used by Ss to record 
their answers to all items. The D items were scored in a dichotomous 
manner (i.e., true or false). Several studies (Peabody, 1962; Korn & 
Gidden, 1964; Shupe & Wolfer, 1966) have shown that with such a scoring 
system total score test-retest reliabilities are at least as high as 
those reported by Rokeach while such scores have a generally high (i.e., 
+.69 to +.94) correlation with total scores attained by means of the 
original six-point scoring system. Thus, for administrative convenience 
and scoring ease, the dichotomous scoring method was used here.
The initial opinionnaire, similar to the one used by Watts (1967), 
consisted of four series of three statements each with each tirad per­
taining to an issue. The three Juvenile Delinquency (JD) items were:
(1) Courts should deal more leniently with juvenile delinquents; (2) 
Special consideration and lenient treatment should not be given to 
juvenile delinquents since it is the function of our legal institutions 
to protect the innocent citizen; (3) Understanding and guidance are the 
best techniques for dealing with juvenile delinquents. The trio of 
items dealing with the Puerto Rico (PR) issue included: (1) Puerto 
Rico should be admitted to the Union as the 51st state; (2) It would be 
premature at this point to consider admitting Puerto Rico as a state;
(3) It would be to our advantage in many ways to welcome Puerto Rico as 
the 51st state in the immediate future. Over all three opinion measures, 
this order of items was maintained for both issues. Opinion was measured
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by having check her degree of agreement with each statement on a 
fifteen-point graphic scale positioned below the statement. The left 
end of each scale was labeled "Definitely disagree" (scored as 1) and 
the right end labeled "Definitely agree" (scored as 15). Two of the 
three statements pertaining to each issue were worded so that "Definitely 
agree" responses indicated extreme agreement with the position advocated 
in the statement while the third statement was worded in reverse with 
extreme disagreement with the statement corresponding to the position 
advocated. For each issue the three item scores were summed, with ap­
propriate reflection of items keyed in reverse, so as to provide an 
opinion score for each on each of the issues. Opinion scores could 
range from three to 45 about a theoretical neutral point of 24 with 
high scores indicating support of the issue and low scores indicating 
opposition to the issue. These items were not presented in triads but 
were intermixed throughout the opinionnaire. Also, the initial opin- 
ionnaire contained below the first statement introducing each issue a 
pair of seven-point graphic scales for ascertaining the saliency of that 
particular issue. The first such substatement read "How important do 
you think this issue is?" Underneath was a scale with the words, "Very 
important" (scored as 7) located at the left end and the words "Not at 
all important" (scored as 1) at the right end. The second substatement 
read "How much thought have you given this issue?" At the left end were 
the words "None at all" (scored as 1) while at the right end was the 
phrase "A great deal" (scored as 7). A "yes-no" item was also included 
by which Ss indicated whether or not they had served in the pilot study
the previous semester.
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For purposes of dissociation from the initial opinionnaire, 
the first part of the IPT measure asked the for biographical data ir­
relevant to the purposes of this study. Then followed instructions 
concerning completion of semantic differential profiles together with 
a few concepts, also irrelevant to this study's purposes, to be judged 
along various semantic dimensions. Finally, the graphic rating scale 
opinionnaire appeared containing the same six items pertaining to the 
JD and PR issues that were included in the initial opinionnaire. More 
and different filler items were mixed in with the selected issue items, 
however.
The DPT opinionnaire was identical to the initial measure with 
the exception that the pair of subscales which had appeared beneath the 
first item introducing each issue were omitted.
Procedure 
Initial Measures
The D scale and initial opinionnaire were administered to all 
recitation sections of both introductory and educational psychology 
courses during the first week of the semester. Both forms were given 
as a matter of course without special instructions or explanations 
being given by the recitation instructors.
After eliminating approximately 70 ^s on the basis of incomplete 
or invalidly marked scales, foreign citizenship status, or participation 
in the pilot study, a total of 643 pairs of scales were retained and 
scored. The mean D scores for the introductory and educational psycho­
logy Ss were found to be 17.28 (SD = 5.14) and 16.76 (SD = 5.05), res­
pectively. This difference was not statistically significant (_t = 1.10,
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df = 641). The mean opinion score for the JD issue was 26.00 (SD =
7.92) for the introductory Ss and 26.66 (SD = 7.52) for the educational 
psychology Ss. This difference was not significant (_t = 0.94, df = 641). 
The mean opinion score for the PR issue was found to be 22.57 (SD = 8.18) 
for the introductory Sis and 22.73 (SD = 7.59) for the educational 
psychology Ss. This difference was also found to be non-significant 
(t = 0.22, df[ = 641). Thus, since ^s from introductory and educational 
psychology courses were found not to differ significantly in terms of 
either D or opinionnaire mean scores for either issue, scores from the 
two groups were combined in all later analyses. The mean opinion score 
for the JD issue formed by combining the scores of Ss from introductory 
and .educational psychology courses was found to be 26.16 (SD = 7.83) 
while the similarily formed combined score for the PR issue was found 
to be 22.61 (SD = 8.04 ). The difference between these two mean scores 
was significant (_t = 8.03, df = 641, p <.01), indicating that the JD is­
sue was viewed in a slightly more positive light than the PR issue.
Unlike the D and opinion score distributions, however, the sub­
scale score distributions were not uniformly normal in shape. The dis­
tribution of responses to the question of "importance" for the JD issue 
was quite skewed toward the "very important" end-point for scores of JSs 
from both psychology courses. The median score for each of the two dis­
tributions was included in the score interval of 6. As indicated by 
the median test (Siegel, 1956, pages 111-116), there was no significant 
difference between the central tendencies of the two groups of scores 
(X2= 0.002, df = 1). The distribution of responses to the question of 
"thought" for the JD issue, however, appeared normal in shape for each 
of the two groups. For each group of Ss, the median score was included
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in the score interval of 4. The difference between the central tenden­
cies of the two groups' scores was not significant as measured by the 
median test Q(2 = 0.60, df_ = 1). As for the subscale response distri­
butions associated with the PR issue, the situation was reversed. That 
is, the "thought" responses for both groups of Ss were extremely skewed 
toward the "none at all" end-point rather than falling about the 
theoretically neutral or average point of 4 in a roughly normal distri­
bution as was the case above with the JD issue. For each group, the 
median score was included in the score interval of 2. The difference 
between the groups' central tendencies as indicated by the median test 
was not significant Q(2 = 0.80, df_ = 1). The distribution of "impor­
tance" responses for the PR issue for each of the two groups of Ss was 
essentially normal in shape rather than skewed as was the corresponding 
case above concerning the JD issue. The median score was included in 
the score interval of 4 for each of the two groups' distributions. The 
difference between the two groups' central tendencies was not signifi­
cant as measured by the median test (y2 = 0.05, df = 1). Therefore, 
since j5s from introductory and educational psychology courses were 
found not to differ significantly from each other in terms of rated 
"importance" of either issue or the amount of thought given to each, 
scores from the two groups of £>s were combined in all later treatment 
of this data. Such combined data was analyzed by a two-sample, one- 
tail Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Siegel, 1956, pages 127-136) in order to 
determine whether or not the JD issue was rated as being significantly 
more "important" than the PR issue. The y2 value of 381.94 (df = 2, 
p < .001) indicated that the JD issue was indeed judged significantly
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more "important" than the PR issue. A similar analysis of the combined 
data to determine whether or not Ss indicated giving significantly more 
thought to the JD issue than to the PR issue yielded a x2 value of 
230.01 (df = 2, p < .001). This result indicated that significantly 
more thought was indeed given to the JD issue. Therefore, both in terms 
of judged importance and of amount of thought given it, the JD issue 
was found to be more salient than the PR issue.
In keeping with the plan to create a relatively "pure" opinion 
change situation and considering the results of the pilot study, the 
only Ss considered for inclusion in this study were those females who 
scored within one SD of the mean opinion score of at least one of the 
issues and who scored in the "salient" direction on the sub-scale 
continuua. To provide for normal _S attrition in this repeated- 
measurements design and so insure adequate cell frequencies, it was 
decided to over-sample by selecting at least 100 j[s who fit the above 
criteria for each of the two issues. Attainment of this minimum of 
Ss eligible in terms of the JD issue required inclusion of all those 
scoring 4 and above on both subscale continuua. For those eligible in 
terms of opinion scores on the PR issue, it was necessary to include 
all those scoring 2 and above on both subscales. In this way, 106 J!s 
were chosen for each issue and so constituted the initial pool of 212
Ss eligible for participation in this study.
The D score distribution of Ss associated with the JD issue was 
trichotomized as follows. Beginning simultaneously at the end-points 
of the distribution and working toward the middle, scores were accumu­
lated until a total of at least 34 was reached. This procedure re­
sulted in the following groupings of Ss into one of three D levels: 31-19
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(High); 18-15 (Medium); 14-6 (Low). One with a D score of 19, two 
with scores of 18, and one with a score of 15 were eliminated from the 
formal analyses by use of a table of random numbers in order to achieve 
a frequency of 34 for all D levels.
A similar procedure was followed in the case of Ss associated 
with the PR issue. The groupings into D levels were as follows: 27-19 
(High); 18-16 (Medium); 15-8 (Low). Two Ss with D scores of 15 and two 
with scores.of 19 were randomly eliminated from the formal analyses. In 
addition, in order to achieve a frequency of 34 for all the D levels, 
two Ss with scores of 19 were randomly selected to be included in the 
Medium D level.
Treatment and Immediate Post-treatment 
Opinionnaire Administration
Each J3 within each D level of the two issue groups was placed 
in one of two categories —  Active or Passive —  by means of an odd-even 
designation of each number within sequences of random permutations of 
16 numbers. Thus, the cell frequency (n) of each treatment category of 
each D level within each issue group was 17.
Nine weeks after administration of the initial measures, names 
of the 212 selected Ss were posted in addition to being read aloud in 
the course lecture and recitation sections in an attempt to maximize 
attendance at the treatment sessions which were scheduled for a mid­
week evening two weeks later. Other than as a routine means of ful­
filling course requirements for participation in departmental research, 
nothing as to the nature of the experiment or its relation to the initial 
measures was indicated. Subjects were notified only that they were
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assigned to one of four rooms in the building where most of the recita­
tion sections met.
Eleven weeks after the initial measures were collected, JSs arrived 
in their designated rooms to receive one of four relevant treatment- 
issue combinations: Active-JD; Passive-JD; Active-PR; Passive-PR. That 
is, JSs who previously were identified as having met the criteria for 
inclusion into an issue group were given either the Active or Passive 
treatment in relation to that issue. For example, an JS whose opinion 
score on the JD issue was located within one SD of the mean JD opinion 
score and who scored 4 or above on both of the saliency subscale con- 
tinuua entered a room in which she was to receive either the Active 
or the Passive treatment, the exact treatment having been determined ran­
domly beforehand as mentioned above.
Administration of materials in each of these simultaneously 
meeting groups was handled by one of four graduate student experimenters 
(Es), none of whom was the senior _E. Instructions for the Active 
treatment were to the effect that the study was an attempt to measure 
the kinds and quality of arguments that college students were able to 
improvise supporting a given topic. The Ss were then given three un­
lined sheets of paper, blank but for the statement of the topic at the 
top of the first sheet which statement was the first item in the trio 
of opinionnaire items. Eight minutes were then given over to the 
writing of supportive arguments. After the improvised arguments were 
collected, the IPT opinionnaire was handed out with the declared pur­
pose of discovering if the task just completed as well as certain other 
factors were related to Ss opinions on various topics. After completing 
the IPT, _Ss were dismissed without mention of the planned third opinion
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measure. For Ss in the Passive treatment, the preliminary instructions 
were to the effect that the study was an attempt to develop some in­
struments to measure how college students think critically. They were 
to read a passage and underline the shortest clause in each paragraph 
which summed up the whole point of the paragraph. The Ss were then 
given a single page containing a 600-word passage which included pur­
ported facts incorporated into arguments in support of the title state­
ment. As with the Active treatment, the title was also the first item 
in the trio of opinionnaire items. Eight minutes were allowed for 
the reading and underlining, then the passages were collected. The IPT 
opinionnaires were distributed, filled out, and collected. In all res­
pects, save the preliminary instructions and treatments subsequently 
administered, Active and Passive jjs were handled alike. Of the Ss eli­
gible for inclusions in this study, 146 were present at the treatment 
sessions.
Delayed Post-treatment Opinionnaire 
Administration
Two weeks after the treatment and IPT opinionnaire adminis­
tration, all recitation sections of both psychology courses were given 
the DPT measure. Recitation instructors prefaced this unannounced in- 
class administration with remarks to the effect that the stability of 
opinions expressed at the semester's beginning was being investigaged. 
Only the DPT forms of Ss present at the treatment two weeks earlier 
were scored. Of the 146 Ss who received the treatments, 117 were also 




It was discovered that there was a lack of a practical degree 
of inter-item correlation of scores for each of the issues. Watts 
(1967) made no mention of this lack of strong correlation among these 
same items. For the trio of JD item scores of the 212 £>s included 
within the initial pool, the inter-item Pearson correlations (r̂ 's) 
were as follows: items 1 and 2, +.12; items 1 and 3, +.11; items 2 
and 3, +.14. Although the latter r was found to be statistically sig­
nificant (p <.05, _df = 210), in practical terms such low intercorrela­
tions suggested that opinions concerning three relatively distinct 
aspects of the issue were being measured. Thus, using the summed 
score to measure opinion change, as originally planned, could have 
masked differential treatment effects upon the individual items. The 
same reasoning applies to the PR issue scores. There, the intercor­
relations were as follows: items 1 and 2, +.30; items 1 and 3, +.51; 
items 2 and 3 +.19. Again, although all these correlations were sig­
nificant (p<.01, djE = 210), in practical terms the three items were 
not measuring the same central theme. Therefore, use of the summed 
score could have resulted in the masking of measurable opinion change. 
Since the use of the summed score as a measure of opinion change was
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shown to be less suitable, it was decided to use the individual item 
scores for each of the issues as indices of change. The hypotheses 
and analyses then were applied in terms of the individual item scores 
and not in relation to the summed scores.
An estimate of the individual item score test-retest relia­
bility was obtained by correlating the IPT scores of S_s who did not 
receive treatment on the relevant issue with their initial scores.
That is, JD IPT item scores of 73 S s who received treatment on the 
PR issue were correlated with initial JD item scores and, likewise,
PR IPT item scores of 73 j5s who received treatment on the JD issue 
were correlated with the initial PR items. The item score relia­
bilities over an eleven-week period for the JD items were as follows: 
item 1, +.55; item 2, +.25; item 3, +.59. Correlations similarly 
calculated for the PR item scores were as follows: item 1, +.64; item 
2, +.56; item 3, +.56. With the exception of JD item 2 scores, there 
appeared to be an acceptable degree of item score reliability.
Treatment Effects
Before discussing the effects of prime importance, it should 
be established that opinion change initially occurred in each of the 
treatments or Induction Methods. This was done by conducting for 
each item an analysis of covariance analyzing scores for three levels 
of D and the Treatment versus Control condition. Initial scores were 
used as the covariant and IPT scores as the criterion. Hereafter, 
these analyses will be referred to collectively as Design 1. The num­
ber (N) of S_s included at each of the three levels of D for any item 
ranged from 11 to 14 for a total N of 146. But to facilitate machine
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computation and interpretation of the data, random elimination of Ss 
at some D levels resulted in an individual cell frequency (n) of 11 
for each of the 12 cells comprising each of the covariance designs 
for a reduced total N of 132. Specifically, in the Design 1 analyses, 
pairs of initial and IPT scores of Ss who received either the Active 
or Passive treatment constituted the Treatment scores while pairs of 
scores of Ss who responded to the same items but received treatment 
on the other issue formed the relevant Control scores.
No attempt will be made here in Design 1 analyses to interpret 
theoretically any significant main effects for D for the following 
reasons: (1) the D dimension was added to serve primarily as a sta­
tistical device to increase the precision of testing for the presence 
of Treatment effects, (2) the inclusion of Control j[s indeterminately 
inflated the overall error term by which the effect of D in relation 
to Treatment scores (i.e., Hypothesis 2) could be analyzed. Instead, 
a more appropriate analysis of Hypothesis 2 follows immediately the 
Design 1 analyses.
Tables 1 through 3 display the results of Design 1 analyses 
and adjusted mean IPT scores for JD items 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
Table 1 contains only the expected significant main effect for the 
Treatment v. Control dimension for JD item 1. Contrasts (Winer, 
pages 65-68) among the adjusted column means indicated that the mean 
Active Treatment total score was significantly (_F = 19.00, df = 1/119, 
p c.001) greater than the combined average total scores of the two 
Control groups, as was the mean Passive Treatment total score (J? = 
36.62, djf = 1/119, p <.001). Both Induction Methods, therefore, did
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Table 1
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment and
Control Groups for Item 1 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Levels of Experimental Conditions
Dogmatism
Treatment Control
Induction Method Induction Method
Mean
Active Passive Active Passive Total
High 7.54 9.83 2.66 4.93 6.24
Medium 6.63 7.35 4.04 4.15 5.54
Low 7.33 7.84 4.96 4.12 6.06
Mean Total 7.17 8.34 3.89 4.40
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 11.36 2 5.68 <1 N.S.
Treatment v. Control (TC) 443.21 3 147.73 13.96 <.001
D x TC 65.22 6 10.87 1.02 N.S.
Error 1,259.21 119 10.58
effect significant amounts of congruent opinion change. Table 2 con­
tains both a significant D main effect and the expected significant 
Treatment v. Control main effect. As indicated above, the significant 
D effect is interpreted as representing an irrelevant source of variance 
that has been successfully "blocked out" of the analysis. Perhaps the 
low reliability of JD item 2 scores noted above in the Method section 
contributed an undue amount of variability to the opinion scores such 
that this finding is a statistically spurious one. Concerning the sig­
nificant overall Treatment v. Control effect, contrasts showed that the 
mean Active Treatment total score was not significantly greater than the
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Table 2
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment and
Control Groups for Item 2 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Experimental Conditions 
Treatment Control
Induction Method Induction Method
Mean
Active Passive Active Passive Total
High 7.46 9.08 4.60 8.76 7.48
Medium 7.92 8.74 7.94 6.71 7.83
Low 11.19 10.12 7.45 9.97 9.68
Mean Total 8.86 9.31 6.66 8.48
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 123.89 2 61.94 4.10 <.025
Treatment v. Control (TC) 133.39 3 44.46 2.94 <.05
D x TC 108.67 6 18.11 1.19 N.S.
Error 1,797.57 119 15.10
Levels of 
Dogmatism
combined average total scores of the two Control groups (F = 2.41, d_f = 
1/119, p <.20). The mean Passive Treatment total score was, however, 
significantly greater than the combined average total scores of the two 
Control groups (JF = 4.42, d_f = 1/119, p <.05). Perhaps here also the 
low item score reliability attenuated the Treatment effects. At any 
event, the Passive Treatment appeared to have been of sufficient strength 
to have been able to display its effects in spite of the likely dilution 
caused by low score reliability. Table 3 shows a complete lack of sig­
nificant results of any type in relation to Design 1 analysis of opinion 
scores of JD item 3. Inspection of the Control jSs' mean scores gives
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Table 3
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment and
Control Groups for Item 3 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Levels of Experimental Conditions
Dogmatism
Treatment Control
Induction Method Induction Method
___ Active Passive Active Passive
Mean
Total
High 12.76 12.15 12.19 12.41 12.38
Medium 12.67 13.00 12.61 11.41 12.42
Low 12.82 13.72 11.82 12.20 12.64
Mean Total 12.75 ■12.96 12.21 12.00
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 1.70 2 0.85 <1 N.S.
Treatment v. Control (TC) 18.90 3 6.30 <1 N.S.
D x TC 21.49 6 3.58 <1 N.S.
Error 789.20 119 6.63
the most probable cause for this lack of positive results, that of a 
"ceiling effect." That is, since JD item 3 enjoyed a near-maximal level 
of positive endorsement without treatment and since 15 was the highest 
score obtainable, there was not enough room for the Treatment effects to 
display themselves relative to the scores of the untreated Js. Contrasts 
confirmed in a more intimate manner the lack of significant Treatment 
effects. Neither the mean Active nor the mean Passive Treatment total 
scores were significantly greater than the combined average total scores 
of the two Control groups (F = 1.36, _df = 1/119, p <.25 and 1? = 2.41, 
df = 1/119, p <.20, respectively).
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Tables 4 through 6 exhibit the Design 1 analyses and the adjusted 
mean IPT scores for PR items 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Table 4 indi­
cates that both a significant D main effect as well as the expected sig­
nificant Treatment v. Control main effect was obtained. This significant
Table 4
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment and 
Control Groups for Item 1 of the Puerto Rico Issue





Active Passive Active Passive Total
High 9.72 11.59 9.68 8.73 9.93
Medium 10.59 10.57 7.03 7.91 9.02
Low 9.22 10.66 7.81 6.17 8.46
Mean Total 9.84 10.94 8.17 7.60 -
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 46.98 2 23.49 4.38 <.025
Treatment v. Control (TC) 231.32 3 77.10 14.40 <.001
D x TC 47.44 6 7.90 1.47 N.S.
Error 637.01 119 5.35
D effect indicates that the precision of the test for the Treatment v. 
Control effect was thereby increased. Contrasts among the column means 
indicated that the mean Active Treatment total score was significantly 
(F, = 15.71, elf = 1/119, p <.001) greater than the combined average total 
scores of the two Control groups as was the mean Passive Treatment total 
score (IT = 38.24, _df = 1/119, p <.001). Table 5 reveals essentially
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Table 5
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment and
Control Groups for Item 2 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Experimental Conditions 
Treatment Control
Induction Method Induction Method
Mean
Active Passive Active Passive Total
High 8.12 8.27 8.50 7.62 8.13
Medium 9.36 9.40 6.10 8.27 8.28
Low 7.97 8.02 6.28 5.40 6.92
Mean Total 8.48 8.56 6.96 7.10
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 48.18 2 24.09 4.04 <.025
Treatment v. Control (TC) 72.70 3 24.23 4.07 <.01
D x TC 63.31 6 10.55 1.77 N.S.
Error 708.62 119 5.95
Levels of 
Dogmatism
the same results for PR. item 2 scores; namely, a significant D main 
effect and the expected significant Treatment v. Control main effect. 
Contrasts among the column means in Table 5 found that both the mean 
Active and mean Passive Treatment total scores were significantly 
greater than the combined average total scores of the two Control 
groups (F.= 7.81, df = 1/119, p <.01 and F = 8.68, df = 1/119, p <.005, 
respectively). Because of the significant D main effect, these two 
contrasts were more precise and therefore significant at a higher level 
than would otherwise have been the case had the D effect been non­
significant. Table 6 contains only a significant Treatment v. Control
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Table 6
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment and
Control Groups for Item 3 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Levels of Experimental Conditions
Dogmatism
Treatment Control
Induction Method Induction Method
Mean
Active Passive Active Passive Total
High 9.16 11.13 9.04 8.60 9.48
Medium 9.82 10.36 7.28 8.61 9.02
Low 9.59 10.69 8.49 7.44 9.05
Mean Total 9.52 10.73 8.27 8.22
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 5.80 2 2.90 <1 N.S.
Treatment v. Control (TC) 140.54 3 46.84 11.41 <.001
D x TC 27.47 6 4.57 1.11 N.S.
Error 488.56 119 4.10
main effect. The two contrasts among the column means indicated that, 
once again, both the mean Active and mean Passive Treatment scores were 
significantly larger than the combined average total mean scores of the 
Control groups (F_ = 8.76, df_ = 1/119, p <.005 and _F = 33.04, dT = 1/119, 
p <.001, respectively).
Summarizing the results pertaining to the establishment of Treat­
ment effects over all six items, the following points can be made. For 
the JD items: (1) Treatment effects were clearly shown for item 1 scores,
(2) item 2 scores increased only under the Passive Treatment condition,
(3) there were no Treatment effects for item 3 scores. Low item score
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reliability and a ceiling effect were the most likely reasons for the 
failure to achieve Treatment effects in items 2 and 3, respectively. For 
the PR issue, Treatment effects were clearly exhibited over both Induc­
tion Methods for all items. Finally, for all items the differences be­
tween the mean total scores of the Passive Treatment and the mean combined 
total Control scores were larger than the corresponding differences be­
tween the mean combined total Control scores and the mean total Active 
scores. A more thorough analysis of this latter point follows when Hypo­
thesis 1 is tested.
The Testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2
Hypothesis 1 stated that there will be a significant main effect
favoring the Passive Treatment when IPT scores are analyzed over both
issues. Hypothesis 2 stated that there will be a significant interaction
between D and the Induction Methods when IPT scores are analyzed. Fur-
\ther, Hypothesis 2 stated that this significant interaction would result 
from Low D _Ss having a significantly larger mean score than High D S_s 
within the Active Treatment while Low D S_s possessed a significantly 
lower mean score than High D Ss within the Passive Treatment. Meanwhile, 
Medium D _Ss would have an intermediate position between the two extreme 
groups within both Treatments. To test simultaneously these two hypo­
theses for each of the six items, an analysis of covariance analyzing 
scores for 3 levels of D and the two Induction Methods was performed on 
IPT scores of the same S_s who were included in each of the Treatment con­
ditions in Design 1 above. Initial scores again served as the covariant. 
Thus, for each of the six cells in any of these analyses, hereafter re­
ferred to collectively as Design 2, n = 11 and the total N = 66. For
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ease of exposition, Hypothesis 1 will be considered together with 
Hypothesis 2 in the following paragraphs.
Tables 7 through 9 present the results of Design 2 analysis and 
adjusted mean IPX scores of JD items 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Table 
7 contains no significant results of any kind although the difference
Table 7
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment 
Group for Item 1 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Induction Method
Active Passive Mean Total
High. 7.21 9.67 8.44
Medium 6.30 7.27 6.78
Low 7.01 7.79 7.40
Mean Total 6.84 8.24
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 30.66 2 15.33 1.01 N.S.
Induction Method (IM) 29.60 1 29.60 1.95 N.S.
D x IM 9.31 2 4.65 <1 N.S.
Error 892.24 59 15.12
between the two mean Induction Method total scores clearly favors the
Passive Treatment as hypothesized. Consideration of the size of the 
error term suggests that, even with the increased precision of a co- 
variance analysis, the experimental error associated with item 1 was 
still too great in size to allow such a difference between the two 
Induction Methods to attain statistical significance. When the 
hypothesized order of mean scores within each treatment is considered,
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it is evident that such order is not maintained in either Treatment 
condition since, in the Active Treatment, High and Low D Ss' means 
are reversed in terms of size and the Medium D mean score does not 
occupy an intermediate position while in the Passive Treatment, 
although the scores of High and Low D Ss' means are arranged as 
predicted, the score of the Medium D Sis again does not occupy the 
intermediate position. When compared (Winer, page 598), the differ­
ence between High and Low D scores in both the Active and Passive 
Treatment were found not to be significantly different from each 
other as predicted (F̂  = <1, dLf = 1/59, and _F = 1.28, df = 1/59, 
respectively). Thus, for JD item 1 Hypothesis 1 and 2 both fail of 
support. Table 8 likewise shows a total lack of significant results
Table 8
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment 
Group for Item 2 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Induction Method
Active Passive Mean Total
High 7.52 9.14 8.33
Medium 7.98 8.80 8.39
Low 11.25 10.19 10.72
Mean Total 8.92 9.34
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 81.55 2 40.77 2.37 N.S.
Induction Method (IM) 3.43 1 3.43 <1 N.S.
D x IM 20.90 2 10.45 <1 N.S.
Error 1,012.79 59 17.16
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for. the item 2 analysis although the Passive Treatment again enjoys an 
hypothesized but nonsignificant advantage in size of mean total score 
over the Active Treatment. Considering the cell entries, the hypoth­
esized order of mean scores within the Active Treatment is completely 
maintained with the difference between High and Low D scores signifi­
cant beyond the .05 level (F = 4.43, df_ = 1/59). The predicted order 
of means within the Passive Treatment, however, is reversed. The 
Medium D score does not hold an intermediate position and the differ­
ence between High and Low D scores is not significant (F = <1, jif = 
1/59). Therefore Hypothesis 1 again fails of support while Hypothesis 
2 finds only minimal support. Table 9 also exhibits a complete lack of
Table 9
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment 
Group for Item 3 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Induction Method
Active Passive Mean Total
High 12.97 12.42 12.69
Medium 12.59 13.39 12.99
Low 13.28 13.94 13.61
Mean Total 12.95 13.25
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 9.38 2 4.69 <1 N.S.
Induction Method (IM) 1.45 1 1.45 <1 N.S.
D x IM 5.93 2 2.96 <1 N.S.
Error 381.58 59 6.46
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significant findings for item 3. The column means, however, show another 
nonsignificant favoring of the Passive Treatment in terms of mean total 
score as hypothesized. Although it can be seen that, within the Active 
Treatment High and Low D scores are arranged according to Hypothesis 2, 
the Medium D score is not. The difference between High and Low D scores 
is nonsignificant (£ = <1, cif = 1/59). Within the Passive Treatment, 
the hypothesized order of mean scores is arranged contrary to Hypothesis 
2. Here the difference between High and Low D scores is again nonsig­
nificant (X = 1.97, d_f = 1/59). Hence, for JD item 3 scores both 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 fail of support.
To summarize results for the JD issue, Hypothesis 1 completely 
lacks support although for all three items the Passive Treatment did 
possess the larger mean total score as hypothesized. Hypothesis 2 fared 
little better since there were no significant interaction effects between 
D and the Induction Methods, the order of means within each Treatment 
condition was not consistently maintained, and in only one case did the 
difference between High and Low D mean scores attain predicted signifi­
cance within a Treatment condition.
Tables 10 through 12 present the results of Design 2 analysis 
and adjusted mean IPT scores of PR items 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Table 10 contains as its only significant result that of an Induction 
Method main effect. Inspection of the mean total scores for each 
Treatment indicates that the significant difference favors the Passive 
Treatment as forecasted. Observation of cell entries within each 
Treatment condition reveals that Hypothesis 2 is not supported since 
the D scores under the Active Treatment are not order as anticipated
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Table 10
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment
Group for Item 1 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Induction Method
Active Passive Mean Total
High 10.14 11.77 10.95
Medium 10.50 10.83 10.66
Low 8.93 10.45 9.69
Mean Total 9.85 11.01
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source ss df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 17.78 2 8.89 1.75 N. S.
Induction Method (IM) 22.12 1 22.12 4.37 <.05
D x IM 5.58 2 2.79 <1 N.S.
Error 298.75 59 5.06
nor is the difference between High and Low D scores significant (F = 
1.55, dP = 1/59). Additionally, although the cell means under the 
Passive Treatment are in the predicted order, the difference between 
them is not significant (F = 1.87, df_ = 1/59). Hypothesis 1 thus sur­
vives disconfirmation while Hypothesis 2 does not for PR item 1. Table 
11 displays the results for Design 2 analysis of PR item 2, none of 
which are significant. However, once again the Passive Treatment pos­
sesses the larger mean total score. Examination shows that for the 
Passive Treatment the cell means for the D levels are not maintained 
in the predicted order. Also, the difference between the extreme 
groups' scores is not significant Q? = <1, df_ = 1/59). The same 
criticism holds for scores under the Active Treatment. Again, the
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Table 11
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment
Group for Item 2 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Induction Method
Active Passive Mean Total
High 8.25 8.36 8.30
Medium 9.56 9.58 9.57
Low 7.99 8.31 8.15
Mean Total 8.60 8.75
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 26.59 2 13.29 2.09 N.S.
Induction Method (IM) 0.38 1 0.38 <1 N.S.
D x IM 0.22 2 0.11 <1 N.S.
Error 374.71 59 6.35
difference between High and Low D scores was not significant (_F = <1, 
df = 1/59). Hence, both hypotheses fail of support when PR. item 2 scores 
are considered. Table 12 presents the Design 2 analysis of PR item 3 
scores which shows only a significant main effect for Induction Methods 
favoring the Passive Treatment as forecasted. Observation of cell 
entries within the Active Treatment condition indicates that, although 
the High and Low D scores are in the anticipated order, the Medium D 
score does not lie between the two scores. Also, the hypothesized dif­
ference between the High and Low scores is not significant (_F <1, _df = 
1/59). Identical, criticism holds for the scores under the Passive Con­
dition. The difference between High and Low D scores is not significant 
(F_ <1> iilL = 1/59) . Therefore, for PR item 3 scores Hypothesis 1 survives 
disconfirmation while Hypothesis 2 does not.
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Table 12
Adjusted Immediate Post-treatment Mean Scores of the Treatment
Group for Item 3 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Induction Method
Active Passive Mean Total
High 9.40 11.22 10.31
Medium 9.92 10.43 10.18
Low 9.53 10.65 10.09
Mean Total 9.62 10.77
Summary of Analysis of Covariance
SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 0.49 2 0.24 <1 N.S.
Induction Method (IM) 21.88 1 21.88 5.07 <.05
D x IM 4.74 2 2.37 <1 N.S.
Error 254.50 59 4.31
To summarize results for the PR issue, Hypothesis 1 withstood 
disproof on two of the three items while on the third the predicted 
difference was not great enough to attain statistical significance. 
Hypothesis 2 did not manage such a degree of support since there was 
a total lack of significant interaction between D and the Induction 
Methods, the hypothesized order of means within each Treatment condi­
tion was not consistently sustained, and in none of the six cases was 
the expected significant difference between High and Low D scores 
obtained within a Treatment condition.
The Testing of Hypotheses 3 and 4 
Hypothesis 3 stated that over the IPT-DPT interval Ss at all 
levels of D within the Active Treatment will maintain their relative
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positions in terms of size of mean scores without a significant inter­
action between D and the interval but that there will be a significant 
main effect for D since it was predicted in Hypothesis 2 that for Ss 
in the Active Treatment High D mean scores should be significantly 
smaller than Low D mean scores at the IPT measuring point. To test 
Hypothesis 3, a factorial design analyzing scores for three levels 
of D at the IPT and DPT measuring points with repeated measures was 
conducted for each Actively treated group of- Ss over all six opinion 
items. Such analyses are hereafter referred to collectively as Design 
3. Since normal _S "shrinkage" resulted in a reduced N at the final DPT 
measuring point, the n's and N's for Design 3 were correspondingly re­
duced. For the JD treatments, n ranged from 8 to 12 for each D level 
of DPT measures while for the PR Treatments n ranged from 7 to 12.
That is, these n's represent those _Ss who were present at all three 
points of opinion measure. It was decided to randomly eliminate some 
Ss at certain levels of D in order to achieve equal n's to facilitate 
machine computation and interpretation of results. Thus, for the JD 
issue n = 8 for all levels of D over all three items in Design 3 while 
for the PR issue n = 7. In sum, for the JD issue n = 8 and N = 48 
while for the PR issue n = 7 and N = 42.
Tables 13 through 18 present the results of Design 3 analysis 
and mean scores by D level and IPT-DPT measuring point for the 
Actively treated scores of JD and PR items 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
Table 13 presents the results of Design 3 analysis of Actively treated 
JD item 1 scores. As can be seen, none of the results are significant. 
The failure to find the significant D main effect' as hypothesized is
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Table 13
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of the
Active Treatment Group for Item 1 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point
Immediate Post- Delayed Post­
treatment treatment Mean
Total
High 8.12 7.00 7.56
Medium 8.25 7.62 7.93
Low 8.87 8.25 8.56
Mean Total 8.41 7.62
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Between Subjects 709.48 23
Dogmatism (D) 8.16 2 4.08 <1 N.S.
Ss w/in Groups 701.31 21 33.39
Within Subjects 107.50 24 -■
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 7.52 1 7.52 1.59 N.S.
D x I 0.66 2 0.33 <1
I x Ss w/in Groups 99.31 21 4.72
primarily caused by the earlier disconfirmation of that part of Hypoth­
esis 2 which predicted significant differences between High and Low D 
scores at the IPT point. Cell entries show that the relative position 
with respect to size, however, was maintained over the interval by 
scores at all D levels. Incidental is the drop, though nonsignificant, 
in scores over the interval at all levels of D. Hypothesis 3 thus fails 
to be confirmed. Table 14 contains the Design 3 analysis of Actively 
treated JD item 2 scores. None of the results are significant. Al­
though earlier in testing Hypothesis 2 at the IPT point High D mean
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Tab le 14
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of the
Active Treatment Group for Item 2 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point
Immediate Post- Delayed Post­
treatment treatment Mean
Total
High 7.87 8.37 8.12
Medium 9.25 10.00 9.62
Low 10.25 9.37 9.81
Mean Total 9.12 9.25
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Between Subjects 770.81 23
Dogmatism (D) 27.37 2 13.68 <1 N.S.
Ss w/in Groups 743.43 21 35.40
Within Subjects 92.50 24
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 0.18 1 0.18 <1 N.S.
D x I 6.12 2 3.06 <1 N.S.
I x Ss w/in Groups 86.18 21 4.10
scores were found to be significantly larger than Low D mean scores, 
this advantage in size was not maintained over the two-week long IPT- 
DPT interval since the High D mean score increases over the interval 
while the mean score of the Low D S_s drops, thus reducing the differ­
ence betweem them to a nonsignificant level. Perhaps this finding is 
an artifact caused by the low item 2 score reliability. There is a 
slight nonsignificant rise in mean total scores over the interval. 
Hypothesis 3 thus fails again of confirmation. Table 15 shows that 
there are no significant results to be found in the analysis of JD
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Table 15
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of the
Active Treatment Group for Item 3 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point




High 12.62 12.00 12.31
Medium 11.50 12.50 12.00
Low 13.75 13.37 13.56
Mean Total 12.62 12.62
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Between Subjects 185.25 23
Dogmatism (D) 21.87 2 10.93 1.40 N.S.
Ss w/in Groups 163.37 21 7.77
Within Subjects 70.00 24
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 N.S.
D x I 6.12 2 3.06 1.00 N.S.
I x S s  w/in Groups 63.87 21 3.04
item 3 Actively treated scores. Again, the lack of a D main effect is 
due largely to the earlier disconfirmation of Hypothesis 2. In this 
case, the mean total IPT and DPT scores are identical. Hypothesis 3 
is again found to be lacking support. Table 16 contains the Design 3 
analysis of Actively treated PR item 1 scores. As can be observed, 
none of the results are significant, although the IPT-DPT interval 
main effect approaches significance. This trend indicates a near­
significant drop in mean total scores over the interval. Hypothesis
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Table 16
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of the
Active Treatment Group for Item 1 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point




High 10.71 10.00 10.35
Medium 11.57 10.71 11.14
Low 9.28 8.00 8.64
Mean Total 10.52 9.57
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Between Subjects 246.90 20
Dogmatism (D) 45.76 2 22.88 2.04 N.S.
Ss w/in Groups 201.14 18 11.17
Within Subjects 51.00 21
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 9.52 1 9.52 4.19 N.S.
D x I 0.61 2 0.30 <1 N.S.
I x S_s w/in Groups 40.85 18 2.26
3 is not confirmed in this analysis. Table 17 exhibits the results of 
the Design 3 analysis of Actively treated PR item 2 scores. Here the 
hypothesized D main effect is obtained but inspection of cell entries 
indicate that the order of the means of the two extreme groups is the 
reverse of that hypothesized earlier by Hypothesis 2. In this case, 
the High D _Ss instead of the Low D _Ss as predicted possess and main­
tain the larger mean score over the interval. Thus, Hypothesis 3
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Table 17
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of the
Active Treatment Group for Item 2 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point




High 9.42 10.71 10.07
Medium 10.71 10.57 10.64
Low 6.85 6.42 6.64
Mean Total 9.00 9.23
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Between Subjects 372.90 20
Dogmatism (D) 131.04 2 65.52 4.87 <.025
Ss w/in Groups 241.85 18 13.43
Within Subjects 61.50 21
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 0.59 1 0.59 <1 N.S.
D x I 5.90 2 2.95 <1 N.S.
I x Ss w/in Groups 55.00 18 3.05
cannot be said to be supported by this analysis. Table 18 contains the 
results of the analysis of Actively treated PR item 3 scores, none of 
which are significant. Inspection of the means suggests that the 
failure to obtain the hypothesized D main effect here is due primarily 
to the earlier failure to confirm Hypothesis 2 in terms of significant 
IPT differences between the means of the two extreme groups. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3 fails of support in relation to PR item 3 scores.
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Table 18
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of the
Active Treatment Group for Item 3 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point




High 10.42 11.57 11.00
Medium 10. 71 11.14 10.92
Low 9.57 9.00 9.28
Mean Total 10.23 10.57
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Between Subjects 207.62 20
Dogmatism (D) 26.33 2 13.16 1.30 N.S.
Ss w/in Groups 181.28 18 10.07
Within Subjects 20.50 21
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 1.16 1 1.16 1.48 N.S.
D x I 5.19 2 2.59 3.30 N.S.
I x Ss w/in Groups 14.14 18 0.78
Summarizing the results of Design 3, the following points can 
be made: (1) in only one case of six was there an hypothesized sig­
nificant difference between High and Low D mean scores; unfortunately, 
the order of size was contrary to an earlier hypothesis, (2) the failure 
to confirm this earlier Hypothesis is the prime reason why Hypothesis 3 
also failed of support since, even though different _Ss are analyzed here 
in Design 3 than were in Design 2, the predicted D main effect would be 
very difficult statistically to obtain without the prior significant 
IPT main effect, (3) there is no consistent pattern of change of the
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mean total scores over the interval; increase appears to be as likely 
as decrease.
Hypothesis 4 states that for Passively treated scores there 
will be significant interaction between D and the IPT-DPT interval 
caused by an increase in mean score of Low D Sis while the High and 
Medium D Ss' scores maintain their IPT levels over the interval. To 
test Hypothesis 4, the same kind of analyses that was used to test 
Hypothesis 3 was employed. Collectively, these will be labeled Design 
4 analyses. For the JD issue, n = 8 and N = 48 while for the PR issue 
n = 7 and N = 42 for all three items. Table 19 contains the Design 4
Table 19
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of the 
Passive Treatment Group for Item 1 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point




High 9.12 8.00 8.56
Medium 6.62 6.25 6.43
Low 6.87 5.87 6.37
Mean Total 7.54 6.70
Summary of Analysis <Df Variance
Source SS df MS F p
Between Subjects 538.25 23
Dogmatism (D) 49.62 2 24.81 1.06 N.S .
Ss w/in Groups 488.62 21 23.26
Within Subjects 113.00 24
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 8.33 1 8.33 1.69 N.S .
D x I 1.29 2 0.64 <1
I x S_s w/in Groups 103.37 21 4.92
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analysis of JD item 1 scores which were Passively treated. As can be 
seen, none of the results are significant. Instead of increasing as 
predicted, the mean scores of the Low D _Ss decrease over the interval 
as in fact do the scores of the other two groups of _S s. Hypothesis 4 
is thus not confirmed. Table 20 contains no significant results for
Table 20
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of the 
Passive Treatment Group for Item 2 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point




High 10.25 9.50 9.87
Medium 9.62 9.50 9.56
Low 10.75 10.12 10.43
Mean Total 10.20 9.70
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Between Subjects 420.91 23
Dogmatism (D) 6.29 2 3.16 <1 N.S.
Ss w/in Groups 414.62 21 19.74
Within Subjects 115.00 24
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 3.00 1 3.00 <1 N.S.
D x I 0.87 2 0.43 <1 N.S.
I x Sis w/in Groups 111.12 21 5.29
the Design 4 analysis of JD item 2 scores. Inspection of the cell 
entries indicates that, as before, all three groups' mean scores 
actually decrease over the interval. Hypothesis 4 is again not
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supported. Table 21, however, does contain a significant interaction 
as hypothesized between D and the interval for JD item 3 scores. Un­
fortunately, inspection of the cell means reveals that the Low D group 
contributes primarily to the significant interaction by exhibiting a
Table 21
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of the 
Passive Treatment Group for Item 3 of the Juvenile Delinquency Issue







High 13.50 13.62 13.56
Medium 13.50 12.50 13.50
Low 13.87 11.25 12.56
Mean Total 13.62 12.79
-
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects 172.91 23
Dogmatism (D) 10.04 2 5.02 <1 i
Ss w/in Groups 162.87 21 7.75
Within Subjects 85.00 24
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 8.33 1 8.33 3.05 1
D x I 19.29 2 9.64 3.53
I x Ss w/in Groups 57.37 21 2.73
decrease over the interval in direct contradiction to the hypothesis. 
Thus Hypothesis 4 is not supported. Table 22 contains only a non- 
hypotbesized significant IPT-DPT interval main effect in the Design 4 
analysis of PR item 1 scores. Observation of the cell means indicates
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Table 22
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of
the Passive Treatment Group for Item 1 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point




High 11.28 9.57 10.42
Medium 10.57 9.14 9.85
Low 10.28 8.14 9.21
Mean Total 10.71 8.95
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F p
Between Subjects 182.33 20
Dogmatism (D) 10.33 2 5.16 <1 N. S.
Ss w/in Groups 172.00 18 9.55
Within Subjects 119.50 21
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 32.59 1 32.59 6.82 <.025
D x I 0.90 2 0.45 <1 N.S.
I x j3s w/in groups 86.00 18 4.77
that this result signifies a significant decrease in mean scores over 
the interval for all D levels. Again, Hypothesis 4 fails of support. 
Table 23 shows another significant Interval main effect in Design 4 
analysis of PR item 2 scores. It can be seen that this result reflects 
a significant decrease of scores over the interval over all levels of 
D contrary to hypothesis 4. Table 24 shows the nonsignificant results 
of Design 4 analysis of PR item 3 scores. Observation of the cell means 
shows that, contrary to Hypothesis 4, Low D scores decrease enough over
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Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of
Table 23
the Passive Treatment Group for Item 2 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point




High 9.14 8.57 8.85
Medium 9.71 8.57 9.14
Low 8.42 5.85 7.14
Mean Total 9.09 7.66
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Between Subjects 201.90 20
Dogmatism (D) 32.76 2 16.38 1.74 N.S.
Ss w/in Groups 169.14 18 9.39
Within Subjects 108.00 21
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 21.42 1 21.42 4.87 <.05
D x I 7.42 2 3.71 <1 N.S.
I x Ss w/in Groups 79.14 18 4.39
the IPT-DPT interval to offset increases by the other two groups. 
Hypothesis 4 thus again fails of support.
The following points can be made with regard to Design 4 analysis 
of Passively treated JD and PR item scores: (1) in only one of six cases 
was a significant D by IPT-DPT Interval interaction obtained; however, 
such result was in the opposite direction from that hypothesized, (2) 
in two of six cases, there was an unpredicted significant decrease in 
mean total scores over the interval; in the other four cases, there was
a decrease in such scores over the interval.
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Table 24
Immediate Post-treatment and Delayed Post-treatment Mean Scores of
the Passive Treatment Group for Item 3 of the Puerto Rico Issue
Levels of Dogmatism Opinion Measuring Point




High 10.28 10. 71 10.50
Medium 10.71 10.85 10.78
Low 10.42 8.85 9.64
Mean Total 10.47 10. 14
Summary of Analysis of: Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Between Subjects 114.47 20
Dogmatism (D) 9.90 2 4.95 <:1 N.S.
Ss w/in Groups 104.57 18 5.80
Within Subjects 66.50 21
IPT-DPT Interval (I) 1.16 1 1.16 <1 N.S.
D x I 8.19 2 4.09 1.29 N.S.
I x JSs w/in Groups 57.14 18 3.17
The Analysis of Issue Saliency
To investigate the effects of issue saliency upon amount of 
opinion changes, jSs' IPT scores were converted to standard T scores 
using initial scores as a basis for such conversion. In this way,
IPT item score distributions for the two issues were made comparable. 
A factorial analysis analyzing scores for three levels of D over each 
Induction Method for both issues was conducted for items 1, 2, and 3 
using as cell entries IPT scores which had been converted into T
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scores. Scores of those jSs who had been included in Design 2 above 
were used here so that n = 11 and N = 132 for each of the 3 x 2 x 2  
factorial designs. Tables 25, 26 and 27 display the mean standardized 
IPT scores and the results of the analysis of IPT scores of items 1,
2, and 3, respectively.
Table 25
Mean Standardized Immediate Post-treatment Scores of 
Item 1 of Both Issues
Levels of Dogmatism Issues
Juvenile Delinquency Puerto Rico 
Induction Method Induction Method
Active Passive Active Passive
Mean
Total
High 60.70 67.04 60.33 66.80 63.72
Medium 57.37 57.03 61.09 62.99 59.62
Low 59.70 58.37 54.23 60.71 58.25
Mean Total 59.26 60.82 58.55 63.50
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 711.99 2 355.99 2.18 N.S.
Induction Method (IM) 349.51 1 '349.51 2.14 N.S.
Issues (I) 32.29 1 32.29 <1 N.S.
D x IM 181.55 2 90.77 <1 N.S.
D x I 253.48 2 126.74 <1 N.S.
IM x I 95.08 1 95.08 <1 N.S.
D x IM x I 86.48 2 43.24 <1 N.S.
Within cell 19,531.15 120 162.75
Total 21,241.52 131
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Table 25 contains no significant results, indicating that there 
was not a reliable difference between mean IPT scores of the two issues 
as a result of the Treatment although there appears to have been con­
gruent opinion change for most Ss since all the scores are above 50.00. 
It should also be noted that the Passive Induction Methods have the 
higher mean total scores. This lack of the predicted effect of issue 
saliency on item 1 of both issues is puzzling since this item for each 
issue was the title of the passage read in the Passive treatment and 
was the theme about which Ss were instructed to write in the Active 
condition. Therefore, if issue saliency were a relevant variable as 
supposed, differential effects should be obtained when the central 
themes of two different issues are directly compared. Perhaps in 
view of the lack of strong inter-item correlation for each issue, 
item 1 is not necessarily perceived as representing a global, unify­
ing theme subsuming more particular points mentioned in items 2 and 
3 for each issue. In other words, all three items are relatively 
independent from each other so that each item is affected or not by 
the treatments without such effect, or lack of it, being automatically 
transmitted to other items pertaining generally to the same topic.
Each of the three items for each issue thus seems to be perceived cog­
nitively as a distinct, almost unrelated aspect of the same general 
topic. Table 26 contains both a significant Issues effect as hypoth­
esized and a significant D x Issues interaction. Inspection of the 
cell means reveals that the higher mean IPT standard score is uni­
formly associated with the PR issue while scores for the JD issue 
seem to indicate a negative reaction to the treatment or "boomerang
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Mean Standardized Immediate Post-treatment Scores of 
Item 2 of Both Issues
Table 26
Levels of Dogmatism Issues
Juvenile Delinquency Puerto Rico 
Induction Method Induction Method
Active Passive Active Passive
Mean
Total
High 45.53 49.25 54.69 54.69 51.
Medium 46.63 48.60 60.10 60.10 53.
Low 54.51 51.88 52.46 56.60 53.
Mean Total 48.89 49.91 55.75 57.13
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 233.07 2 116.53 1.24 N.S.
Induction Method (IM) 47.57 1 47.57 <1 N.S.
Issues (I) 1,636.10 1 1,636.10 17.43 <.001
D x IM 7.52 2 3.76 <1 N.S.
D x I 685.48 2 342.74 3.65 <.05
IM x I 1.04 1 1.04 <1 N.S.
D x IM x I 173.67 2 86.83 <1 N.S.
Within cell 11,259.28 120 93.82
Total 14,043.73 131
effect." That is, compared to their initial scores, jSs who received 
treatment on the JD issue responded on the IPT opinionnaire with scores 
generally lower than those that they had initially recorded. Perhaps 
the most likely explanation of this unusual result is it simply reflects 
again the low item score reliability of JD item 2 and points out how mis­
leading results can be if the measuring instrument is not reasonably 
reliable or consistent over measuring times. The D x Issues interaction
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is probably also due to the poor psychometric characteristics of JD item 
2 scores and should be considered spurious. Thus, "true" effects of 
issue saliency as well as Active versus Passive Induction Methods are 
here confounded with an indeterminate amount of error caused by lack of 
score reliability so that clear statements as to the differential effect 
of each upon amounts of opinion change cannot be made. Table 27 contains
Table 27
Mean Standardized Immediate Post-treatment Scores of 
Item 3 of Both Issues
Levels of Dogmatism Issues
Juvenile Delinquency Puerto Rico 
Induction Method Induction Method
Active Passive Active Passive
Mean
Total
High 52.86 51.52 54.84 60.70 54.98
Medium 50.44 55.00 55.88 57.60 54.73
Low 55.00 55.81 53.12 57.60 55.38
Mean Total 52.77 54.11 54.61 58.63
Summary of Analysis of Variance
Source SS df MS F P
Dogmatism (D) 9.53 2 4.76 <1 N.S.
Induction Method (IM) 237.08 1 237.08 3.70 N.S.
Issues (I) 334.48 1 334.48 5.22 <.025
D x IM 4.30 2 2.15 <1 N.S.
D x I 185.69 2 92.84 1.45 N.S.
IM x I 59.19 1 59.19 <1 N.S.
D x IM x I 142.55 2 71.27 1.11 N.S.
Within cell 7,680.89 120 64.00
Total 8,653.71 131
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only the hypothesized significant Issues main effect. Inspection of 
the cell means and mean totals indicates that, for either Induction 
Method, the higher score is almost always associated with the PR 
issue. Thus, since item 3 scores for each issue have been previously 
shown to have an acceptable degree of reliability, issue saliency may 
here be said to be fairly tested. The results clearly point out that 
there is more opinion change with a less salient issue. It also should 
be noted that the Passive Induction Method once again has the higher 
mean total scores.
In summary, low item score reliability may,have served to 
obscure or prevent a clear test of the effects of issue saliency over 
two of the three opinion items. Where such a confounding factor is 
eliminated, however, the effect displays itself as hypothesized. Also, 
the trend consisting of larger amounts of change occurring under the 
Passive process is again evident in this analysis.
CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The overall findings of this study can be summarized as follows: 
(1) significant amounts of immediate, congruent opinion change did oc­
cur over four of the six items with both Active and Passive Induction 
Methods; (2) over several different kinds of data analyses there was 
a definite trend, including several significant differences, for the 
Passive treatment to effect larger amounts of immediate, congruent 
change than the Active process; (3) however, there was a definite trend, 
including several significant differences, for Passively induced scores 
not to persist but to regress toward their pre-treatment level; (4) 
there was no such trend for scores Actively induced to regress after 
the treatment; (5) there was a trend, including a significant difference, 
for the greater amount of change to occur in relation to the less 
salient PR issue; (6) different levels of D did not appear to be sys­
tematically related to either differential amounts or persistence of 
opinion change.
Concerning points 1 and 2, it is a truism that people change 
their opinions about things, ideas, and people, including themselves. 
Reasons why opinions change are nearly beyond numbering. However, of 
prime concern here is the basis for the superior effectiveness of 
the Passive process in achieving immediate opinion change. Watts (1967), 
using summed scores, found no difference in amount of IPT change between
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the two Induction Methods. However, he claimed to have purposely con­
structed the issues to insure this equality of IPX change. What were 
the causes of the differential treatment effects? For one thing, the 
Passive process involved a one-sided presentation of "facts" —  a 
process which has been shown to evoke change toward the side advocated, 
even among Ss initially opposed (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949). 
In contrast, the Active process was quite unstructured. Subjects sup­
plied their own "facts" based on whatever prior material their memory 
and prejudices allowed them in eight minutes' time, yet opinion scores 
increased significantly under this free-form treatment also. Perhaps, 
too, the edge given the Passive process in amount of immediate change 
was based on a kind of mental inertia or law of least cognitive effort. 
That is, people may very well prefer to deal with or at least be more 
familiar in dealing with a prepared message that delivers a particular 
set of "facts" and draws an explicit conclusion rather than having to 
improvise and set down persuasive reasons for supporting a given topic. 
But even when faced with improvising an argument, Ss manage to display 
the immediate effects of self-proselytization. In brief, the Passive 
process was superior to the Active process in terms of amount of im­
mediate change because the Passive treatment provided a more concrete, 
ready-made, reference/information point than did the Active treatment.
Concerning points 3 and 4, the finding that, in general, Actively 
induced change persists to a higher degree than Passively induced change 
replicated that of Watts (1967). The same reasoning offered by Watts 
for his results very likely applies here also. That is, while Sis in the 
Active treatment condition had no opportunity to gain new information,
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a sense of personal involvement in the task was evoked in each of them 
which led them to engage in such post-treatment behavior as rehearsal 
of relevant arguments, subsequent reading and discussion of the topic, 
and other acts designed to obtain evaluative feedback about their per­
formance and/or remedy their own perceived informational deficiency on 
the subject. This subsequent behavior thus kept the treatment issue 
in focus for each Si which fact was indicated by relatively higher DPT 
scores as compared to those of Passively treated J!_s.
Concerning point 5, it will be recalled that the two issues did 
differ significantly on two measures of saliency with the PR issue 
being the less salient of the two on both measures. It will be argued 
here that this pair of indices gauged the relative degree of intel­
lectual as opposed to emotional saliency of the topics. Emotional 
saliency is defined here as the degree to which a topic is integrated 
into and supported by one's motivational/self-esteem/personality 
patterns. High saliency inhibits persuasive efforts (e.g., Janis & 
Field, 1959; Katz, 1960). Likewise, intellectual saliency or general 
familiarity with an issue may affect the success of attempts to change 
opinions concerning that issue. Given the current national Zeitgeist 
of controversial court rulings and violence involving largely youth, 
most people may be assumed to have had at least minimal exposure to 
and consequently to have formed opinions about court treatment of 
juvenile delinquents. However, statehood for Puerto Rico may be as­
sumed to be a relatively less intellectually salient issue with a re­
sultant lack of familiarity among people in general. Thus, opinions 
about Puerto Rican statehood showed less resistence to persuasive at­
tempts here than lenient court treatment of juvenile delinquents.
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Concerning the final point, it will be recalled that this study 
employed several methodological improvements over earlier investigations 
in the same area. In spite of this fact, D still was found not to be 
a relevant variable. Incidently, strictly speaking, the Hypotheses re­
lating to D and persistence of induced change should be ignored here 
since, as worded, their testing depended upon prior attainment of sig­
nificant D effects at the IPT measuring point which were not obtained. 
There are several alternate explanations for the failure to achieve 
positive results in this study. One is that the dependent measure —  
the opinion item scales —  was psychometrically inadequate, especially 
in terms of reliability. Opinion scores may have been so variable from 
measuring point to measuring point that "true" effects due to any of 
the factors used here were masked by an undue amount of score fluctua­
tion. But the general presence of Treatment effects, differential 
Induction Method effects, and differential persistence measures suggests 
that the item scores were not lacking in this respect. Another possible 
reason is that the two issues were not sufficiently polarized in terms 
of intellectual saliency to allow the effects of D to display themselves. 
An issue even less salient than statehood for Puerto Rico, comparable 
attitudinally to the autokinetic situation where D is a significant 
factor (Vidulich & Kaimen, 1961), may have provided the opportunity for 
a more pronounced D effect. A third reason, the one which is advanced 
here as the most plausible, is that D simply is not an important or 
relevant personality dimension in relation to the type of social influ­
ence situation studied here. Kelman (1961) trichotomizes the area of 
research on social influences into three specific categories: (1) the 
study of social influences on judgments, (2) the study of social
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influence arising from small-group interaction, (3) the study of social 
influence arising from persuasive communications. As has been noted by 
Vidulich and Kaimen (1961), D is a relevant variable in a situation 
that is included in Kelman's category (1). The present study's concern, 
as well as that of the trio cited above (Miller, 1965; Norris, 1965; 
Miller & Lobe, 1967), pertained to category (3). In view of the fact 
that, over these four studies which have used different tasks, analyses, 
response measures, plus additional variables, D has been shown to be only 
of occasional marginal importance in terms of amount of opinion change, 
confidence is increased in the verdict that D lacks importance in studies 
dealing with persuasive communications.
APPENDIX A
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MATERIAL USED IN THE INITIAL MEASURE 
Initial Opinionnaire
_Age___________Sex: M F Date:_N ame_______________________
last (please print) first 
Place your mark (X) at that point along the scale (: X :) that most 
accurately reflects your personal opinion about each of the following 
statements.
1. The courts should deal more leniently with juvenile delinquents.
2.
3.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
a. How important do you
• • • • • • • • • •
think this issue is?
very not
important at all important
b. How much thought have
* 0 • • • • • • • •
you given
• • • •
this issue?
none a
at all great deal
Puerto Rico should be admitted to the Union as the 51st state.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
a. How important do you
« • « • • • • • • •
think this
• • • •
issue is?
very not
important at all important
b . How much thought have
- « « • • • • • • • •
you given this issue?
none a
at all great deal
The Secretary of State should be elected by the people, not appointed
by the President.
• • • * • • • . . • . . . . •
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
a. How important do you think this issue is?
very not
important at all important
b. How much thought have
• • • • • • • • ■ •
you given
• • • •
this issue?
none a
at all great deal
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4. The U.S. would be wise to officially recognize Red China.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
a. How important do you think this
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
issue is?
very not
important at all important
b . How much
• •• •
thought have you given
• • • • • « • • • •
this issue?
none a
at all great deal
Special consideration and lenient treatment should not be giv
to juvenile delinquents since it is the function of our legal
institutions to protect the innocent citizen.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
The Secretary 
• • • •









7. It would be premature at this point to consider admitting Puerto 
Rico as a state.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
8. U.S. recognition of governments such as Red China would deal a 
serious blow to the morale of our allies who are struggling to 
maintain democracy.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
Understanding and guidance are the best techniques; for dealing with
juvenile delinquents.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
Popular election is the be!st system for selecting the Secretary of
State.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
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11. If a government such as Red China exists it should be recognized.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
12. It would be to our advantage in many ways to welcome Puerto Rico 
as the 51st state in the immediate future.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
The following item is to be answered ONLY if you were enrolled in 
Introductory Psychology last semester (i.e., Fall Semester '67-'68).





ROKEACH’S D SCALE ITEMS, FORM E 
SOCIAL-POLITICAL OPINION SURVEY-REV. FORM 67
The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels 
about a number of important social and personal questions. The best 
answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried 
to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find your­
self agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just 
as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether 
you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many 
people feel the same as you do.
First, supply the information requested on the answer sheet. Then, 
read each statement carefully and indicate your answer on the form 
provided. If you agree more than you disagree with an item, mark it 
TRUE but if you disagree more than you agree with a statement, mark it 
FALSE. Remember, we are looking for your personal opinion on these 
items. Work quickly and do not worry or puzzle over individual items. 
Try to make an answer to each item; do not omit any. Be sure that the 
number of the statement agrees with the number on the answer sheet.
Make your marks heavy and black. Erase completely any answer you 
wish to change. Make no marks on this booklet.
*  1. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely
to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.
* 2. While I do not like to admit this even to myself, my secret'am­
bition is to become a great person like Einstein, or Beethovan 
or Shakespeare.
*  3. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he
considers primarily his own happiness.
4. It's mostly those who are itching for a fight who want a univer­
sal military training law.
5. History clearly shows that it is the private enterprise system 
which is at the root of depressions and wars.
*  6. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.
7. I do not always tell the truth.
8. Plain common sense tells you that prejudice can be removed by 
education, not legislation.
9. I gossip a little at times.
10. This much is certain! The only way to defeat tyranny in China 
is to support Chiang Kai-Shek.
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* 11. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because
it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
*12. I would like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to 
solve my personal problems.
13. Once in a while I put off until tomorrow what I ought to do 
today.
14. Once in a while I laugh at a dirty joke.
* 15. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal,
it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain 
political groups.
16. It's usually the trouble-makers who talk about government owner­
ship of public utilities.
17. A person must be pretty shortsighted if he believes that college 
professors should be forced to take a special loyalty path.
* 18. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
19. Make no mistake about it! The best way to achieve security is 
for the government to guarantee jobs for all.
20. It's perfectly clear to all decent Americans that Congressional 
committees which investigate communism do more harm than good.
21. The truth of the matter is this! It is big business which wants 
to continue the cold war.
* 22. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on
until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one 
respects.
23. I would rather win than lose in a game.
24. It's simply incredible that anyone should believe that socialized 
medicine will actually help solve our health problems.
*25. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful 
of really great thinkers.
* 26. The present is all too full of unhappiness. It is only the future
that counts.
*27. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world, there 
is probably only one which is correct.
*28. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what 
I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others 
are saying.
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* 29. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.
30. Sometimes when I am not feeling well I am cross.
* 31. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something
important.
*32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath 
contempt.
* 33. Most people just do not know what's good for them.
34. The American rearmament program is clear and positive proof that 
we are willing to sacrifice to preserve our freedom.
35. I sometimes have a tendency to be too critical of the ideas of 
others.
* 36. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed
important social and moral problems do not really understand
what's going on.
* 37. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest
form of democracy is a government run by those who are most in­
telligent .
38. I get angry sometimes.
* 39. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for
the truth and those who are against the truth.
40. You just can't help but feel sorry for a person who thinks the 
world could exist without a Creator.
41. It is foolish to think that the Democratic Party is really the 
party of the common man.
* 42. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the
things they stand for.
*43. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard
against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than 
by those in the opposing camp.
44. A person must be pretty ignorant if he thinks that the President 
is going to let the "big boys" run this country.
* 45. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion, I just can not stop.
* 46. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life, it is sometimes
necessary to gamble "all or nothing."
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* 47. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's
going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
48. It is very foolish to advocate government support of religion.
* 49. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.
50. Sometimes at elections I vote for men about whom I know very little.
*51. If given a chance I would do something of great benefit to the 
world.
52. It's all too true that the rich are getting richer and the poor 
are getting poorer.
53. A study of American history clearly shows that it is the American 
businessman who has contributed most to our society.
54. A person must be pretty stupid if he still believes in differences 
between the races.
*55. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's 
wrong.
56. It's the agitators and left-wingers who are trying to get Red 
China into the United Nations.
* 57. When it. comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be
careful not to compromise with those who believe differently 
from the way we do.
*58. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself 
several times to make sure I am being understood.
59. It is just plain stupid to say that it was Franklin Roosevelt 
who got us into World War II.
60. My table manners are not quite as good at home as when I am 
out in company.
*61. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause 
that life becomes meaningful.
62. Once in a while I think of things too bad to talk about.
* 63. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays are not worth the
paper they are printed on.
64. Even a person of average intelligence knows that to defend our­
selves against aggression we should welcome all help, including 
General Franco's Spain.
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65. Anyone who is really for democracy knows very well that the only 
way for America to head off revolution and civil war in back­
ward countries is to send military aid.
66. Only a misguided idealist would believe that the United States 
is an imperialist warmonger.
67. It is the radicals and labor racketeers who yell the loudest 
about labor's right to strike.
*68. In the long run, the best way to live is to pick friends and
associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
69. Thoughtful persons know that the American Legion is not really- 
interested in democracy.
*70. It is only natural that a person would have a much better ac­
quaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.
* 71. Most persons just do not give a "damn" for others.
72. I like to know some important people because it makes me feel 
important.
73. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was 
not seen, I would probably do it.
74. A person must be pretty gullible if he really believes that 
the communists have actually infiltrated into government and 
education.
75. Any intelligent person can plainly see that the real reason 
America is rearming is to stop aggression.
76. It's mostly the noisy liberals who try to tell us that we will 
be better off under socialism.
77. At times I feel like swearing.
78. It's already crystal-clear that the United Nations is a failure.
* 79. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly
people who believe in the same thing he does.
80. I do not read every editorial in the newspaper every day.
81. It is the people who believe everything they read in the papers 
who are convinced that Russia is pursuing a ruthless policy of 
imperialist aggression.
* 82. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.
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83. I do not like everyone I know.
* 84. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.
*85. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really 
lived.
*86. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among 
its own members can not exist for long.
87. It's perfectly clear to all thinking persons that the way to 
solve our financial problems is by a "soak-the-rich" tax 
program.
88. It's the fellow-travelers or Reds who keep yelling all the time 
about civil rights.
89. Anyone who's old enough to remember the Hoover days will tell 
you that it's a lucky thing Hoover was never re-elected presi­
dent .
90. It's mainly those who believe the propaganda put out by the 
real estate interests who are against a federal slum clearance 
program.
* D Scale Items
APPENDIX B
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MATERIAL USED IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-TREATMENT MEASURE
Active Treatment Instructions
1. Pass out the blank sheets FACE DOWN. Direct J3s to keep them FACE 
DOWN until instructions have been given. After each S_ has a set of 
blank sheets, say:
"This study is an attempt to measure the kinds and quality of 
arguments that college students are able to improvise about a 
given topic. You will find on the first page a statement con­
cerning a controversial issue. Your task is to organize your 
thoughts and write a strong convincing argument supporting the 
side of the issue indicated. Your task, no matter how you feel 
about it personally, is to write the most convincing argument 
possible pointing out the reasons you can think of in support 
of the issue. At this point, are there any questions? Now 
when I say begin, turn over the sheet, PRINT your name in the 
upper right hand corner, and begin thinking. All right, begin."
2. At the end of 8 minutes, say:
"Stop! Now make sure your name is printed in the upper right 
hand corner then pass your arguments in to me."
3. After all arguments are in, pass out the surveys FACE DOWN and direct 
Ss to keep them FACE DOWN until instructions have been given. After 
each has a survey, say:
"As a minor point of interest in this study, we would like to see 
whether or not the task you have just completed as well as certain 
other factors may be related to your opinions on various topics.
It may be that people differing in the kinds and quality of 
arguments they write or freshmen and seniors or Democrats and 
Republicans may also have different opinions toward the same topic. 
In order to see if any such relationship does exist, we would like 
you to complete this survey. Now when I tell you to turn the 
survey over, be sure to PRINT all the information asked for.
When you have finished, please remain seated for final instruc­
tions. All right, turn to page 3, item 7. There is a typographi­
cal omission in item 7. Insert the word vote between the words 
popular and total. Now go back to page 1 and begin filling out 
this survey."
Passive Treatment Instructions
1. Pass out the messages FACE DOWN. Direct Ss to keep the message FACE 
DOWN until instructions have been given. After each has a copy 
of the message, say:
"This study is an attempt to develop some instruments to measure 
how college students think critically. You will be asked to read 
a brief message dealing with a controversial issue and then to
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underline within each paragraph the shortest clause which you • 
think sums up the point of that paragraph. You will have 8 
minutes to read the message and underline the clauses. At 
this point, are there any questions? Now when I say to begin, 
turn over the sheet, PRINT your name in the upper right hand 
corner, and begin reading and underlining. All right, begin."
2. At the end of 8 minutes, say:
"Stop! Now make sure your name is printed in the upper right 
hand corner then pass the message in to me."
3. After all messages are in, pass out the surveys FACE DOWN and direct 
Ss to keep them FACE DOWN until instructions have been given. After 
each has a survey, say:
"As a minor point of interest in this study, we would like to 
see whether or not the task you have just completed as well as 
certain other factors may be related to your opinions on various 
topics. It may be that people who are different in the way in 
which they think critically or freshman and seniors or Democrats 
and Republicans may also have different opinions toward the same 
topic. In order to see if any such relationship does exist, we 
would like you to complete this survey. Now when I tell you to 
turn the survey over, be sure to PRINT all the information asked 
for. When you have finished, please remain seated for final 
instructions. All right, turn to page 3, item 7. There is a 
typographical omission in item 7. Insert the word vote between 
the words popular and total. Now go back to page 1 and begin 
filling out this survey."
Juvenile Delinquency Issue— Passive Treatment
COURTS SHOULD DEAL MORE LENIENTLY WITH JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
The last quarter of a century has witnessed a vast amount of re­
search on the problem of juvenile delinquency. The studies have largely 
dealt with the causes of delinquency and the means of guiding the delin­
quent into a more satisfactory role,in society. One of the conclusions 
reached is that the courts should deal more leniently with juvenile 
delinquents. This view is based on the following evidence. The environ­
ment, not the child, is usually to blame for delinquency. If the delin­
quent is placed in a reform school, it leaves a stigma on his record that 
will later prevent him from obtaining a responsible job and assuming a 
position as a useful member of society. The typical reform school would 
be more appropriately called a crime school.
It is a well-established fact that environment is the most power­
ful factor influencing personality development. The vast majority of 
all juvenile delinquents come from very inferior environments. Slum 
neighborhoods and broken homes or homes with both parents working are 
the common background factors in delinquency. Children raised under 
these conditions lack the attention and guidance they need while growing 
up. They must form their friendships and attachments among their peer
95
group in the neighborhood. In doing this they are exposed to a disease 
as much as someone who has been exposed to smallpox, a disease for which 
we have no simple immunization. This disease is the values held by the 
neighborhood gangs— disrespect for the laws and values of our society.
It is a natural tendency to conform to and imitate the values of one's 
group. If it were not for this conformity, and imitation, our culture 
would not be transmitted, our children would not value democracy, honesty, 
freedom of speech, etc. The identical process is at work in the juvenile 
delinquent and in the college professor's son; the basic difference is the 
set of values that they learn to conform to. They have accepted the 
values of their neighborhoods and friends which are different than the 
standards of our society as a whole. Harsh treatment cannot help the 
juvenile delinquent; only understanding and education can do that.
When a court commits a juvenile delinquent to a reform school, it 
is doubtful if they realize the full consequences of their act. At the 
moment the youth has violated the law and the main concern is to teach 
him respect for it. On the surface the punishment is loss of freedom 
for a period of time. In reality this is only the beginning. After being 
released from the reform school, the person will find it impossible to 
obtain a responsible job. Employers frown upon hiring a person with a 
"prison record." The stigma of having served time in a reform school 
remains with the person permanently, preventing him from assuming his 
position as a useful member of society. He will probably grow out of 
the period of delinquency but cannot outgrow the black mark on his re­
cord .
A juvenile delinquent is committed to a reform school to "reform" 
or correct his behavior. However, statistics show that 87 per cent "of 
all people who have served a sentence in a reform school or a prison are 
imprisoned again within ten years after their release. It is obvious 
that our penal institutions fail to establish the desired change in be­
havior. The reason for this failure is that our reform schools are in 
reality crime schools. Here a first offender is put in with a group of 
people ranging from novices like himself to hardened criminals. For the 
period of time of his sentence he intimately associates with this group, 
he works with them and makes friends among them. He serves an appren­
ticeship in crime and comes out a more clever criminal rather than a law- 
abiding citizen.
Puerto Rico Issue— Passive Treatment 
PUERTO RICO SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO THE UNION AS THE 51ST STATE
The U. S. recently admitted Alaska and Hawaii as the 49th and 50th 
states to the Union. It is time to follow this practice and welcome 
Puerto Rico as the 51st state. There are numerous compelling reasons 
for taking this action without further waste of time. In the near future, 
it may be vital to our defenses to establish large military bases on 
the island. In the present world situation of propaganda and power
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politics, it would strengthen our position by spreading democracy and 
showing the world that the U. S. does not have racial antipathy. Ad­
mitting Puerto Rico as a state would be economically advantageous to 
both countries.
In regards to the first point mentioned, the U. S. is now in grave 
danger of losing its large military base in Cuba. Guantanamo is in a 
precarious position located in complete isolation on the island and 
surrounded by a government that we do not recognize. The situation has 
progressively deteriorated since Castro came into power until the con­
tinued existence of the base is endangered. While it is true that should 
a showdown concerning the base occur the U. S. has sufficient might to 
crush opposition, the world would disclaim such action as shocking ag­
gression. Nevertheless, we must have bases in the Carribean to maintain 
our nation's defenses. Puerto Rico offers an equally good location for 
these vital Carribean bases. Admitting Puerto Rico as a state would make 
it one of us and bind it to us more closely, preventing any future hos­
tilities as in the case of Cuba. We could then feel free to develop our 
military bases without fear of future difficulties and at the same 
time establish a stronghold of democracy in the Carribean to help stem 
the infiltration of Latin America by the Castro Regime.
In the present struggle of world power, communism is pitted against 
democracy for supremacy. Communist propaganda has seized upon the re­
cent U. S. integration problem as an opportunity to attack us. The real 
situation has been exaggerated and distorted. U. S. democracy has been 
attacked as being unable to solve our problems at home and on the grounds 
of racial prejudice. The present opportunity of admitting Puerto Rico 
as a state would be a strong blow against such propaganda. It would, show 
the world our sincerity in wanting to spread democracy and that charges 
of racial antipathy are not true.
Admitting Puerto Rico as a state would be economically advantageous 
to both countries. We import many products from Puerto Rico which have 
high tariffs and quotas imposed on them. This results in a hardship on 
both the American consumer and the exporter. The consumer must pay high 
prices for the product to absorb the import duties. For example, a pair 
of sandals that Puerto Rico manufactures and sells for one dollar costs 
the American consumer three dollars. The largest part of this difference 
goes for the import-duties; it does not find its way to Puerto Rico 
raising their standard of living. For the exporter in Puerto Rico, the 
quotas set upon the products rigidly limit the amount that he can ship to 
the U. S. Tariffs and quotas may be desirable with countries that manu­
facture products in competition with our manufacturing companies, but 
with Puerto Rico this is not the case. The products they produce in 
quantity and export are not in competition with our own products. Wel­
coming Puerto Rico as a state would remove these tariffs and quotas 
opening the door to free trade and resulting in economic advantages to 
both countries.
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Student Opinion Survey— Immediate Post-treatment
Name_____________________________Age______________Sex M F Date
First (please print) last
Psychology course currently enrolled in intro educ. Room_____________
Class rank- Fr. Soph. Jr. Sr. American Citizen- Yes No Major
Minor_______. Do you plan graduate work- Yes No Is North Dakota
your home state- Yes No Political preference- Dem Repub Indepen't 
Fraternity/Sorority member- Yes No
The first part of this opinionnaire requires that you judge certain 
concepts, people, or events against a series of descriptive scales. For 
each concept, simply place your mark (X) at that point along each scale 
that most closely corresponds to your opinion about that concept. Thus, 
in the example below, the concept ICE CREAM is to be judged against a 
series of descriptive scales.
ICE CREAM
unpleasant:___:___ : ___: pleasant
sincere: : : : : : :  : insincere
Your mark (X) should be placed at that point along each scale that 
corresponds most closely with your opinion about the concept. Thus, 
you would probably put your X near the pleasant end of the first scale 
above. However, you may think that the second scale, sincere-insecure 
is irrelevant to the concept of ICE CREAM. In this case, you would prob­
ably place your X in the middle space. This middle space may also be 
used to register your opinion that a concept is equally associated or 
neutral with respect to both sides of the scale. Remember in making 
your answers to the first part of this opinionnaire to follow these 
rules:
(1) Place your mark in the middle of the space, not on the boundaries.
THIS NOT THIS
: : : : X
(2) Mark every scale for every concept— do not omit any.
(3) Never put more than one X on a single scale.







MARTIN LUTHER KING 
: : : : : :  disapprove
: : __:___:___ : dishonest
:___:___ :  :___ : wise
:___:___ :___:___ :___: worthless
:___:___ ____:___: hard








AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM
_:___r  _:_______________ : approve
_:___ :___ :___ :___ :__ :__ :bad
___:____:___ : :__ :__ : foolish
_____:____:___:___:___:___:sof t
__:___:___:___ :___ :___: _: untrustworthy
: : : : : :  :cold






















This is the end of part 1 of this opinionnaire. The second part begin­
ning on the next page requires a similar form of indicating your opinions 
Remember, place your X in the middle of the space.
THIS NOT THIS
: X : : : X :
1. The Electoral College is not a vital part of our Presidential elec­
tion process.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
2. Married women make better primary teachers than single women.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
3. Puerto Rico should be admitted to the Union at the 51st state.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
4. Devaluation of the dollar as a means of manipulating the US economy 
should never be used.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
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6. The use of drugs such a s  
regulated.









7. The Electoral College results are an
candidate's popular total.
• • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • •
accurate
• • • 
• • •
reflection of a
• • • • 













primary teachers than married women 









9. It would be premature at 
Rico as a state.









10. Special consideration and lenient treatment should not be given 
to juvenile delinquents since it is the function of our legal 



















12. LSD and marijuana are no more harmful than liquor 










13. The Electoral 
share in the
College system does not 
election of a president.










14. Married women make better primary teachers than single women since 









15. It would be to our advantage in many ways to welcome Puerto Rico 









16. Devaluation of 
US's domestic
the dollar now would 
economic situation.









17. The use of LSD or marijuana leads to dangerous and undesirable 

























MATERIAL USED IN THE DELAYED POST-TREATMENT MEASURE 
Opinionnaire Instructions— Delayed Post-treatment Measure
1. Request that the opinionnaire be kept FACE DOWN until instructions 
have been read.
2. Pass out opinionnaires FACE DOWN.
3. Read the following after each S_ has an opinionnaire:
"At the beginning of this semester you rated the extent of your 
agreement with a number of statements concerning current issues. 
Today we would like you to check them again so as to see 
whether the population's opinion on these issues is changing 
over .time or, instead, is relatively stable. When you have com­
pleted the opinionnaire, pass them in to me."
Opinionnaire— Delayed Post-treatment Measure
Name__________________________ Age________Sex: M F Date_________
last (please print) first THIS NOT THIS
Place your mark (X) at that point along the scale (: X : X :
that most accurately reflects your personal opinion about each of 
the following statements.
1. The courts should deal more leniently with juvenile delinquents.
• • • • • • • • • • • a *  • • •
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
2. Puerto Rico should be admitted to the Union as the 51st state.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
3. The Secretary of State should be elected by the people, not appointed 
by the President.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
4. The U.S. would be wise to officially recognize Red China.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
5. Special consideration and lenient treatment should not be given to 
juvenile delinquents since it is the function of our legal insti­








6. The Secretary of State should be appointed by our President.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
7. It would be premature at this point to consider admitting Puerto 
Rico as a state.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
8. U.S. recognition of governments such as Red China would deal a 
serious blow to the morale of our allies who are struggling to 
maintain democracy.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
9. Understanding and guidance are the best techniques for dealing 
with juvenile delinquents.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
10. Popular election is the best system for selecting the Secretary 
of State.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
11. If a government such as Red China exists it should be recognized.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
12. It would be to our advantage in many ways to welcome Puerto Rico 
as the 51st state in the immediate future.
definitely mildly neutral mildly definitely
disagree disagree agree agree
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INITIAL AND IMMEDIATE POST-TREATMENT OPINION SCORES OF HIGH, MEDIUM 
AND LOW DOGMATIC SUBJECTS WHO WERE INCLUDED IN DESIGNS 1 AND 2
Juvenile Delinquency Issue— Active Treatment
DOGMATISM
SCORES





JD PR JD PR JD PR JD PR JD PR JD PR
22 5 8 10 8 14 8 15 14 15 11 15 11
22 4 8 4 1 12 8 5 10 3 8 15 10
22 4 8 5 4 15 6 10 8 14 9 15 9
20 2 8 12 12 11 11 5 13 6 13 11 14
19 6 9 12 10 15 10 10 9 10 9 12 8
19 5 8 14 8 14 8 6 8 4 8 15 8
26 3 8 11 5 14 10 12 8 11 6 15 8
24 8 7 8 8 11 7 11 8 6 8 13 8
23 5 8 12 8 8 8 5 11 5 8 9 8
22 5 11 11 10 10 11 2 12 5 10 11 9
31 7 8 10 5 15 8 4 8 4 5 11 8
18 5 8 14 3 14 8 13 8 13 8 15 8
16 4 7 10 8 5 8 1 5 5 5 5 5
18 6 8 10 8 13 12 4 6 4 6 14 5
17 6 12 6 10 14 11 5 7 5 5 11 7
16 2 7 11 8 15 8 3 6 5 8 15 9
17 7 8 10 6 3 8 15 8 15 3 15 8
16 5 8 13 8 11 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
16 8 5 2 7 13 8 12 8 13 8 11 8
18 4 13 5 13 15 14 2 15 4 14 11 15
18 3 2 15 2 1 8 11 1 14 1 13 8
16 4 1 13 2 15 5 1 1 2 1 15 2
14 11 8 6 8 15 10 15 11 11 8 13 8
10 6 6 11 4 15 1 11 2 15 5 15 6
9 4 8 5 8 15 9 8 8 11 8 12 8
12 5 8 11 1 15 14 3 8 15 1 15 11
14 5 8 12 3 14 8 12 8 14 6 15 11
13 4 8 14 8 15 8 4 8 14 8 11 8
13 5 8 11 5 11 9 7 9 10 5 13 8
14 3 12 5 6 13 9 3 10 5 5 12 9
13 3 8 4 8 15 8 4 8 6 8 15 8
14 4 10 . 15 9 14 9 11 9 10 4 15 9
7 3 8 15 8 15 8 4 8 13 8 14 8
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1 2 3 1 2 3
JD PR JD PR JD PR JD PR JD PR JD PR
24 5 11 10 10 14 10 6 10 5 11 1 11
20 5 8 11 8 11 8 12 8 15 8 15 8
23 2 13 3 8 15 12 15 13 4 9 15 13
21 1 8 15 3 15 7 3 8 9 7 15 8
19 5 5 13 3 11 8 12 5 11 2 14 3
23 10 8 6 1 15 11 8 8 8 1 15 10
19 4 8 9 5 11 8 11 11 13 11 12 10
24 2 10 14 11 15 13 10 11 12 10 13 13
23 4 6 7 6 13 6 11 5 13 5 15 6
22 5 5 13 8 11 8 11 8 8 8 9 8
20 2 8 5 3 12 8 5 11 2 8 13 8
18 3 11 3 11 15 13 8 13 6 11 15 12
17 3 7 14 8 15 7 5 13 13 13 15 12
17 3 10 14 8 12 10 3 9 11 8 13 8
15 5 2 13 3 14 2 12 1 12 8 15 3
17 2 4 15 4 12 3 1 5 2 8 12 8
16 4 8 4 8 13 8 4 8 4 8 10 8
15 6 11 5 12 13 11 10 8 11 8 12 8
17 5 8 11 8 14 8 2 8 4 8 15 8
18 4 8 14 8 15 8 11 8 15 8 15 8
16 2 8 11 10 15 6 4 8 4 10 13 8
18 4 1 5 5 14 1 14 1 15 5 15 5
12 4 8 6 5 12 8 11 5 13 4 14 7
13 4 5 12 3 8 5 8 8 8 8 11 5
13 2 7 13 3 13 4 2 4 14 3 15 5
11 5 8 11 8 15 8 10 10 11 8 15 10
9 5 8 10 2 10 11 8 8 8 8 12 8
13 2 5 4 3 13 4 10 5 12 2 13 8
12 2 11 13 11 14 10 3 8 10 5 15 8
9 4 7 13 1 15 2 12 1 9 1 15 1
9 4 11 11 11 12 11 5 5 15 2 15 8
9 3 7 13 6 14 8 4 8 11 5 13 8
13 4 8 2 2 14 8 5 5 1 5 15 8
107
Puerto Rico Issue— Active Treatment 
























































































































































































1 2  3
______ Items_______
1 2  3
JD PR JD PR JD PR JD PR JD PR JD PR
20 4 8 15 2 15 8 6 8 5 5 15 9
20 4 8 6 8 12 8 11 15 12 11 5 12
22 5 8 14 5 14 2 3 8 13 5 11 8
21 5 8 15 2 15 15 5 11 14 9 15 15
21 4 10 3 8 11 8 4 12 2 8 11 8
21 1 11 9 8 5 8 1 15 10 8 10 13
20 9 8 15 11 12 10 5 13 13 12 15 12
22 2 3 15 8 15 4 1 13 15 8 15 11
24 5 8 3 6 15 8 4 13 4 9 15 11
20 11 9 13 8 15 13 11 12 4 5 15 15
20 5 10 4 7 12 11 6 10 6 10 12 10
18 3 8 10 8 11 8 1 11 2 7 15 11
16 6 11 10 8 11 8 7 8 7 8 10 9
16 3 9 4 6 12 6 5 14 11 13 14 13
17 1 8 2 8 15 8 1 8 10 8 15 8
16 2 7 2 9 11 7 1 13 3 12 7 12
18 5 8 10 5 12 11 5 8 6 6 12 8
18 5 13 12 5 15 11 1 15 11 11 15 14
19 3 8 4 11 13 11 8 11 11 11 15 11
18 3 4 4 5 13 11 1 8 2 8 3 8
16 5 8 14 11 14 5 5 11 5 11 11 11
18 1 9 15 8 14 8 1 13 1 12 11 10
12 1 8 3 8 2 10 1 8 10 8 4 12
13 5 8 13 8 8 8 5 11 12 11 11 11
14 5 11 5 5 13 10 5 11 11 11 12 13
14 4 3 12 11 15 5 6 12 10 10 15 8
9 3 8 12 6 10 8 3 11 14 11 11 12
11 7 5 8 8 11 8 1 8 2 8 13 8
13 5 8 10 8 10 8 3 11 12 6 13 11
13 10 5 13 10 14 5 4 11 10 10 13 10
9 5 8 5 8 5 8 5 8 6 8 5 8
14 2 10 11 11 15 8 5 11 15 6 15 11
10 5 7 11 11 9 8 8 12 7 7 13 11
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IMMEDIATE POST-TREATMENT AND DELAYED POST-TREATMENT OPINION SCORES 
OF HIGH, MEDIUM, AND LOW DOGMATIC SUBJECTS WHO WERE 
INCLUDED IN DESIGNS 3 AND 4
Juvenile Delinquency Issue— Active Treatment







1 2 3 1 2 3
22 . 15 15 15 15 15 15
22 5 3 15 1 5 11
22 10 14 15 10 15 15
20 5 6 11 2 6 7
19 10 10 12 11 11 12
24 11 6 13 6 7 10
23 5 5 9 6 6 14
31 4 4 11 5 2 12
18 13 13 15 11 13 15
17 2 2 11 3 4 10
16 1 5 5 2 4 11
18 4 4 14 11 11 12
17 15 15 15 8 12 14
16 8 8 8 8 8 11
16 12 13 11 12 14 13
18 11 14 13 6 14 14
14 15 11 13 13 2 14
10 11 15 15 11 15 15
9 8 11 12 12 11 11
14 12 14 15 10 13 12
13 7 10 13 6 10 12
14 3 5 12 3 4 14
13 4 6 15 2 11 15
14 11 10 15 9 9 14
Ill
Juvenile Delinquency Issue— Passive Treatment
DOGMATISM
SCORES
IMMEDIATE POST TREATMENT 
MEASURES






1 2 3 1 2 3
23 5 11 15 3 11 14
21 3 9 15 3 4 12
19 12 11 14 11 11 15
23 8 8 15 11 13 14
19 11 13 12 11 13 12
24 10 12 13 11 12 14
22 11 8 9 6 7 13
21 13 10 15 8 5 15
17 3 11 13 3 5 14
18 12 12 12 12 13 13
15 12 12 15 12 13 15
16 5 15 15 4 13 14
16 4 4 10 4 4 10
17 2 4 15 3 3 14
18 11 15 15 8 14 15
16 4 4 13 4 11 13
13 2 14 15 2 14 15
11 10 11 15 11 13 15
9 8 8 12 7 8 10
13 10 12 13 3 5 8
12 3 10 15 3 12 13
9 12 9 15 5 7 15
9 4 11 13 11 11 3
8 6 11 13 5 11 11
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3 1 2 3
8 8 8 9
15 15 12 15
11 8 11 13
9 10 9 10
8 7 12 11
9 8 8 8
13 14 15 15
10 8 8 9
14 14 13 13
9 11 11 12
13 13 14 14
10 11 10 11
8 8 8 8
11 10 10 11
11 5 3 10
9 9 10 9
11 10 6 10
9 10 4 10
11 8 6 10
11 10 11 9
5 4 5 5
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3 1 2 3
9 9 11 9
8 9 8 10
14 12 11 11
8 11 5 13
12 12 12 12
11 4 3 11
10 10 10 9
11 8 6 11
8 7 6 7
12 7 7 9
14 13 12 13
11 13 13 12
8 5 5 13
11 11 11 11
12 6 6 8
13 6 3 12
8 8 8 5
11 10 6 6
10 12 6 11
8 8 8 10
11 7 4 10
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ITEM SCORE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS USED AS A BASIS FOR 
CONVERTING IMMEDIATE POST-TREATMENT SCORES INTO 




Mean 4.80 9.40 11.95







Standard Deviation 2.38 2.85 2.64
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